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THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE GREEKS

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BY

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PREFACE

THE present book contains little that will be new to a classical scholar who is familiar with modern Anthropology. To others, there may be some interest in an account of certain speculations, held by the most quick-witted and curious of human races, on the origin and development of their own species.

Greek philosophers did not call themselves anthropologists—the *ἀνθρωπολόγος* was no better than a gossip or busybody—but they framed, and tried to answer, many of the anthropological problems of to-day. Their science has at least an historical value, even if we deny it any great intrinsic merit; although here, too, we may well remember

*Some things they knew that we know not;
Some things we know by them unknown.*

Of classical scholars who are also anthropologists, I owe a debt to the work of one in particular—Prof. J. L. Myres, who first showed clearly that the Greek had a right to be called an anthropologist. I should perhaps add that my ideas on Herodotus were mainly formed before I had the opportunity

of reading his essay in *Anthropology and the Classics*; but my obligation for confirming or correcting these ideas is great.

To my friend Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, F.R.S., I owe much besides the kindness of proof-reading; and my thanks are also due to Prof. Ridgeway, Mr. T. R. Glover and Mr. W. H. Duke for suggestions and criticisms.

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INTRODUCTION

AMONG the remarkable anticipations of later science in the great poet of Epicurean philosophy, perhaps the most striking is the wonderful passage in which Lucretius describes the origin and primitive state of the human race. Epicurus himself, after a period of modern popularity, has declined in reputation, even among those who are in sympathy with his main position as a rationalist. His materialism has been found untenable; for Atomism, though the most fruitful legacy of the ancients to modern science, cannot be regarded as an ultimate explanation of reality. His hedonism, if no longer treated with Stoic scorn or Christian reproach, has been generally acknowledged as resting on an insecure psychological basis. Finally, the practical Epicurean life—self-centred, impassive, unoccupied with social or political affairs—is out of touch with modern ideals of private and public duty. But the Epicurean anthropology, although by no means free from the limitations of all ancient thought, was planned on true principles, and its foundations have stood the test of time.

It is no small honour to the genius of the Roman poet that, in studying Greek anthropology, we turn

first to the fifth book of the *De Rerum Natura* rather than to Aristotle. Indeed, Lucretius is so completely a master of his subject, and writes with so much imagination and enthusiasm, that he has been credited with originality of thought as well as of treatment.¹ He has been called 'the first anthropologist'—a term which would be meaningless if it did not imply a claim that his point of view was original. To deny, or at least to restrict, this claim is no disparagement of Lucretius; his reputation does not depend on any newness of method or material, but on the spirit which he infused into the Epicurean system. In physics, ethics, and religion it has always been recognised that he closely follows his Greek authorities—the school was noted for its fidelity to the founder's teaching—and there is no reason to suppose that, in anthropology alone, Lucretius was more independent.

As the Epicureans denied the existence of a Creator, assuming that the world came into being by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, it follows that man also is fortuitous. The earth, from which he sprang, so far from being divine—as the ancients commonly supposed—is not even a living body, although Lucretius inconsistently describes it in terms appropriate to an animal. Human origin belonged to a time when the earth was strong enough to bear huge monsters; now it is effete, and spontaneous life is confined to the smallest creatures. While the first men were stronger and taller than the present race, there were no giants on the earth in those days. Lucretius steadily sets his face against the abnormal, just as his whole account

of human history rejects the mythical. There never was a Golden Age ; man has progressed from a savage state in which he lived for many centuries, a naked dweller in caves and woods, ignorant of fire and of the simplest arts. At this time, there were neither morals nor laws ; family life was unknown, and love was only the sexual instinct of an animal. Man's chief danger was from the attack of wild beasts ; and although he was aided by ' his wondrous strength of hands and feet,' his rude weapons—stones and clubs—did not always avail him. Lucretius then describes the first steps in civilised life—the invention of huts, the use of skins for clothing, the discovery of fire, and the institution of marriage. In all this, the impersonal force, which he calls Nature, showed the way, leaving further progress to the gradual growth of man's own experience.

*Usus et impigrae simul experientia mentis
paulatim docuit pedetemptim progredientes.*

As no progress is possible without the use of fire, the Epicurean poet is specially careful to insist on its discovery by natural causation (whether by lightning or by branches rubbing together in the wind), for the myth of Prometheus the Fire-bringer was deeply rooted in popular belief. So, too, the art of metallurgy was accidental, when some forest-fire had liquefied the metals on the surface of the earth. The first rude essays on agriculture were prompted by Nature's own example. Equally natural was the origin of all other arts ; the first musical instrument—the pipe—was suggested by the wind whistling through hollow

reeds, and music was gradually improved by rustic experiment in solitary groves and pastures,

per loca pastorum deserta atque otia dia.

Writing came almost last in the history of human inventions, 'whence,' as Lucretius adds with proper caution, 'our own age cannot discover what was done in former days, except where reason points the way.'

In all this account, Lucretius lays stress on the average experience of the race, though he does not deny that some inventions were due to 'those who were superior in mind and intelligence.' But these men were only *primi inter pares*; he refuses to accept the traditions of heroes, to whose instruction the Greeks commonly attributed their progress; and as the gods have no concern with human affairs, the culture-god—a Hermes or a Demeter—is as fictitious as the culture-hero.

Was primitive man to be envied? The Greeks, even when most contemptuous of the belief in a Golden Age, were often unconsciously subject to its influence; and it has been suggested that Lucretius too may have felt a half-secret longing for the simplicity of an uncivilised life.² A true Epicurean, he hated all luxury: his definition of pleasure was the absence of pain, and his ideal of enjoyment was an innocent picnic by the riverside. But, though an enthusiast for the simple life, Lucretius was under no delusions about the lot of our first ancestors. If they were spared some of the dangers which befall the civilised, they had dangers of their own. There is small happiness in

his vivid picture of early man, sometimes lacerated by boar or lion—‘a living victim entombed in a living sepulchre’—sometimes poisoned by unwary experiment on novel food, sometimes fighting for possession of the skins with which he has learnt to cover his nakedness. Lucretius has no doubt that Progress makes for good. But Progress may go too far: a plain citizen, in his homely dress, is more fortunate than the unclothed or skin-clad savage; but even the savage is better than the luxurious Roman in his purple toga.

Such, in the merest outline, is the Lucretian anthropology. But we must remember that, if Lucretius borrowed from Epicurus, that philosopher, in his turn, stood at the end of a long line of Greek thinkers. The Hellenic genius had already passed its zenith when Epicurus framed a system with elements drawn from various sources—from Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Archelaus, as well as from Democritus and Aristippus. Moreover, if Epicurus was the heir of the Greek ages, he was not in undisputed possession. His great rivals—Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics—differed from each other in their views on man’s place in the universe; but they were agreed in hostility to Epicureanism as the common foe. Greek anthropology was by no means an exclusive preserve of the Epicurean school; and to obtain a just perspective, we have to regard the antecedents, not only of the rationalists, but also of their opponents.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE METHOD OF GREEK ANTHROPOLOGY	1
II. THE ORIGIN AND RISE OF MAN	25
III. PHILOSOPHIC ANTHROPOLOGY	47
IV. THE PROBLEM OF RACE	69
V. THE CITY-STATE	90
NOTES	103
INDEX	111

ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE GREEKS

CHAPTER I

THE METHOD OF GREEK ANTHROPOLOGY

THE Science of Anthropology may be said to start with the question: Whence came man? Did he 'grow' or was he 'made'? Such a problem must have occurred to the first men who were capable of any intellectual effort; and we find, in fact, that many savage races have circumstantial stories to account for the origin of man, as well as of the world. Other inquiries would naturally follow: How long has man existed, and how did he live in former days? Did he always possess his present knowledge of arts and handicrafts, or how did he acquire it? These further questions are equally within the range of speculation among races of very low mental power, and must have been familiar to the Greeks for centuries before Homer and Hesiod, the two poets who not only represent the earliest stage of anthropology, but exercised enormous influence on the course of later Greek thought. As to the nature of this influence, it may still be necessary

to guard against misconception. The Greeks were quite unfettered by the orthodoxy of Sacred Books. A few years ago it was a commonplace to speak of Homer and Hesiod as the Greek Bible ; but the analogy is now seen to be more misleading than illuminating, for the authority of the Epic poets differed in kind as well as in degree from that of Scripture.¹ The Biblical account of the origin and primitive condition of man was final, and for many centuries closed the door to all independent speculation. Homer and Hesiod could claim no such sanctity ; they were interpreters of the Muses, but their message was not verbally inspired, and even the Muses—as Hesiod himself reminds us—‘ know how to speak many lies which are like the truth.’² From the sixth century onwards there were those who, like Xenophanes and Plato, protested against the theology of Homer, or, like Thucydides and Eratosthenes, impugned his accuracy ; and the quarrel between poetry and philosophy became a proverb. But all learning—in anthropology as in other sciences—began with the Epic poets, the first ‘ teachers ’ of Greece ; and, until the rise of a more comparative method, Homer and Hesiod were the sole authorities for the early history of mankind. Hence there was a dangerous tendency to regard Homer as good evidence of the ‘ primitive,’ whereas we now realise that the Homeric poems are, in the main, the expression of a highly organised and advanced society. Early Greece was thus confused with early man. On the other hand, the Epic certainly throws occasional light on customs and institutions outside the range of

the civilisation with which it is primarily concerned ; and these hints were more or less correctly interpreted by later Greeks, and formed the basis of a true comparative method. Thus, Homer knew or had heard of a barbarous 'unpolitical' people, whose life was so strange that it could belong only to monsters. These one-eyed Cyclopes lived in a patriarchal and pastoral stage, without 'customs' (θέμιστες) or common assemblies—in a word, without law and society, the first principles of Hellenic civilisation ; and when, at a later date, the Greeks came into contact with actual peoples partaking in these characteristics, they were already prepared by Homer to recognise the importance and interest of this stage in human development.

The anthropological record of the Epic poets was too scanty and imperfect to be of much use to a Greek inquirer. Happily, to supplement the poet, other evidence was forthcoming, from the colonist and the merchant, the explorer and the soldier of fortune. By the beginning of the fifth century the world had greatly expanded since the Epic period, when geographical knowledge was practically confined to lands bordering on the Aegean. During the eighth and seventh centuries—the great age of colonisation—Greek settlements had been established from the furthest shores of the Euxine to the mouth of the Rhone and the eastern seaboard of Spain. Egypt had been thrown open by the foundation of Naucratis ; Cyrene had been colonised on the African coast. In the East, Asiatic Greeks had long held intercourse—

peaceful or hostile—with various foreign tribes—Phrygians, Lycians, Carians, and many others. They had fallen successively beneath the Lydians and Persians. With the growth of the Persian empire, Asia had become known to the Greek merchant as far as Susa. The progress of geography is marked by Anaximander, who made the first map, and by Hecataeus, whose *Description of the Earth* (γῆς περίοδος) paved the way for Herodotus. By the time of Aeschylus, the Greeks had some knowledge of many savage or semi-savage tribes, as well as of ancient civilisations like the Persian and Egyptian.

Nor must it be supposed that the Greek acquaintance with barbarian nations, even on the confines of the known world, was always superficial. The success of the Greek colonies depended on trade with the interior. Cyrene, for instance, developed a flourishing commerce with the Libyan tribes, and Massilia with the Gauls—though these latter were certainly kept at arm's length—while the cities of Magna Graecia and Sicily had more or less intimate relations with their barbarian neighbours. Phasis and Dioscurias, Milesian colonies on the Euxine, established traffic with wild Caucasian tribes, and Greek merchants from Panticapaeum (Kertch) brought stories to Athens of savage customs in the Crimea.

Behind the fringe of the known world lay the unexplored country of which dim rumours had reached the ears of the Greeks since the time of Homer. Where even rumour failed, imagination had free scope in peopling the earth with wonderful inhabitants. We

may perhaps trace two main principles that guided, to some extent, the riotous fancy of the early Greek : the outer world was either filled with semi-human monsters, or with people who, in some measure at least, still enjoyed the Golden Age. In the former class it may be sufficient to recall the Cyclopes and Pygmies of Homer, the ' Half-Dogs ' (*ἡμίκυνες*) and ' Big-Heads ' (*μακροκέφαλοι, μεγαλοκέφαλοι*) of Hesiod, and the one-eyed Arimaspi of the Epic poet Aristeas. As instances of the second class we may mention the ' blameless Aethiopians,' the ' burnt-faced ' men in whom Homer idealises the dark-skinned races of Asia and Africa ; the Abii, ' justest of men,' who live in the north ; and the mysterious Phaeacians. Homer does not speak of the Scythians by name ; but, by the time of Aeschylus, their nomad tribes had become famous for a well-ordered life.³

It is impossible to gauge the amount of exact information that may underlie these reports concerning the outer world. Travellers' tales are proverbial for mendacity, and the Greeks had as yet no standard of discrimination. They knew that there were peoples in stages of culture very different from their own—wild savages, cave-dwellers,⁴ nomad tribes, all more or less alien to the ' political ' life ; but their ignorance of the limits within which human variation is possible led them to acquiesce in any marvel, provided that it was sufficiently removed from their own sphere of experience. Even their human ' freaks ' may no doubt have had some foundation in fact ; for, although Dwarfs and Hop-o'-my-Thumbs are common in folklore,

the Pygmies may have been suggested by a real knowledge of dwarfish tribes in Africa. But all these stories of strange folk appear to have the same value to the Epic poet—the one-eyed Cyclops is no more astonishing than the Pygmy, nor the dog-faced man than the cave-dweller.

This wonderland was the legacy of Homer to the Greeks of the fifth century, and Aeschylus, at least, enters on his heritage with all the Epic spirit. His 'outer' world is full of fabulous people—monstrous Gorgons and Phorcides, one-eyed Arimaspi and Gabii, the justest and most hospitable of men, whose land yields spontaneous fruit.⁵ Of course it may be objected that all this is merely traditional folklore, in which Aeschylus neither believed himself nor expected his audience to believe, any more than Shakespeare's audience—in spite of all their wonder at the marvels of the New World—would believe, like Desdemona, in

'men whose heads
Do grow beneath their shoulders.'

There is, however, but little force in this objection, if we may judge from the attitude of Herodotus, who had hardly begun his travels when Aeschylus composed the *Prometheus Vinctus*, and finished his history at a time when the Sophistic movement had attained a firm hold over Athens. Herodotus must have been far less credulous than the Athenian of the previous generation—his experience had taught him that, within the range of his own considerable observation,

man's nature is uniform. For example, he is unable to accept, without reservation, the Aeschylean idea of the noble Scythian—while approving of one Scythian custom, 'the rest,' he frankly says, 'I do not admire.'⁶ But, if some illusions have been shattered, Herodotus cannot be acquitted of the charge of credulity; for, in becoming sceptical, he is not consistent in his scepticism. The Greek love of a good story was not soon to be baulked, and tales no longer appropriate to the nearer Scythians might be true for Hyperboreans in the remoter North, or for Africa, the proverbial land of marvels. With this lingering desire to accept tradition he passes such marvels as a one-eyed race of Arimaspi without a protest, if without conviction; 'at any rate the ends of the earth do produce the things we think most fair and rare.'⁷ Herodotus, in fact, wavered in the vague principles of his anthropology no less than in his religion, where he so often halts between orthodoxy and scepticism. His service to rational science was immense—he has been justly called the Father of Anthropology as well as of History; but the absence of a clearly-defined canon of criticism made his work far more remarkable for its collection of ethnological facts than for any principles of general scientific value. The progress of Greek anthropology, after Herodotus, was not so much due to the addition of new material (although this was considerable) as to the development of an inductive method in co-ordinating and explaining the old material.

It is now an accepted principle that the science of

Anthropology rests on the comparative study of races. This inductive method seems to indicate (though it certainly does not prove) an essential similarity in the processes of human minds, where no contact is possible ; and it has suggested the inference that civilised races inherit, as mere vestiges or survivals, many customs and institutions and modes of thought which are in full working order among less cultured peoples. No doubt the method has been misapplied and often used too loosely. However interesting it may be to survey mankind from China to Peru, an authority on the Chinese is not likely to have an intimate knowledge of the Peruvians ; and, if he had, he would probably be the first to point out that, after all, China is *not* Peru. In recent years there has been a revulsion from this world-wide outlook, and anthropologists have begun to adopt a more intensive system, by which each separate area of mankind has been plotted out for special work. But the broad and comprehensive study has still its uses ; for particular results, obtained from the smaller area, must always be tested by broad principles deduced from our general knowledge of man. Now, the Greeks entirely lacked the intensive method. Their grasp of induction was always precarious, a few observations being held sufficient to prove arguments which really rested on *a priori* reasoning ; and an almost total lack of experiment prevented the foundation of physics or chemistry. In biological science, however, the Greeks achieved far greater success. Here the field of observation was more accessible, and the material more abundant ;

and Aristotle, who failed as a physicist, was able to construct a marvellous system of descriptive zoology. And, as anthropology is a branch of biology—it is the merit of the Greeks that they fully recognised this cardinal fact—the science of Man was able to share the success of other biological subjects. It would, indeed, be more correct to say that the success was not a little due to the anthropologists, for the Greeks started with their own species: the description of Man by Herodotus is older than the description of animals by Aristotle or of plants by Theophrastus.

The Greek survey of mankind, if it needed intensity, did not fail in breadth. It ranged from Gades to the Ganges, and served to anticipate many of the general conclusions which were afterwards to be re-established by modern anthropology, concerning the past history and the present condition of the human race.

In regard to the past, it is a matter of common knowledge that Greek opinion was divided. The old Hesiodic belief in a Golden Age, from which man has degenerated, encountered a serious rival in the theory of Ascent. Both theories, in their inception, were merely guesses, unsupported by any evidence worthy of the name; but, when the two came into conflict, the need of argument was increasingly felt, and, in default of any strict theological dogma, the argument was bound to be mainly anthropological, i.e. based on a comparative method, however faultily or insufficiently applied. Here, of course, the evidence of savage or uncivilised society is not conclusive in itself. As we

see from the Cynics, the Greeks, like Rousseau, could interpret civilisation as a proof of degeneracy, while the upright Scythian still trailed at least some clouds of the Golden glory. But it was more natural to infer that the savage represented an older state of society, from which Greece itself had emerged. In this connection, the growth of the comparative method can, I think, be traced from its first tentative beginnings to a complete formulation of the principle. We first find the doctrine of Ascent in Xenophanes and Aeschylus, and it is to be noticed that both these great thinkers were interested in barbarians. Xenophanes makes the first excursion into comparative religion by observing that Thracians and Ethiopians represent their gods after their own image. Aeschylus revels in the new knowledge of Hecataeus, and it can hardly be an accident that the savage occupies so prominent a place in the very drama in which Aeschylus describes the rise of man from the savage state.

But if, as I believe, these two great thinkers were alive to the value of savage evidence, they do not explicitly state the reasons for their belief—the comparative method is but dimly realised; it is still a guess rather than a method. Herodotus seems to have an inkling of its importance, when he explains the evolution of books, which were originally skins, ‘as they still are among barbarians’⁸; but the principle that relics of a lower culture survive in higher civilisation is first stated by Thucydides.

In two or three remarkable chapters the great historian succinctly describes the relation of Greeks

and barbarians: all maritime Greeks were once piratical, and epic poetry shows that the pirate's business—still surviving in some parts of Greece—was not held in dishonour. Hence the wearing of arms in daily life was once universal, just as it is among barbarians. So, again, Asiatics still observe the custom of wearing a loin-cloth in their athletic contests, and it is only in recent years that Greeks have contended at Olympia in complete nudity. 'And many other examples could be quoted'—Thucydides concludes—'to prove that ancient Greeks once resembled the present barbarians in their manner of life.'⁹

The method is complete: in McLennan's words, 'the tradition of the former order of things is sustained by a reference to persisting instances of it on the one hand, and by an inference from the tone of the ancient poets on the other; the causes of the persistence at points being specified, and their ceasing to operate at other points being assumed in explanation of the disappearance on the whole of the ancient barbarities.'

The example of Thucydides was not lost on his successors. Aristotle knew that practically we must begin at the beginning, although theoretically he seems to have believed that the human race had no beginning at all; and his *Politics* is based on the hypothesis that higher types of culture are explained by the lower—that there has been a constant aim of Nature to evolve the perfect civilisation from simple and primitive stages of society. But his great collection of νόμιμα βαρβαρικά has a purpose far beyond the past history of mankind—it is the foundation of a

present or future political science ; for, as he says in the *Rhetoric*, the Greeks must be familiar with the laws of other nations ' in order to know what constitutions suit what peoples.' ¹⁰

Epicurus, too, must have followed suit. Although the record of his own anthropological views is fragmentary, the *locus classicus* for the Epicurean theory of ascent—the fifth book of Lucretius—testifies to the comparative method, even if the poet contents himself with a bare hint of it, in a single line :

' Ut fama est aliquas etiam nunc vivere gentes.'

The Epicurean architect Vitruvius, untrammelled by poetry, is decisive within the limits of his own profession : primitive types of building, still used in Gaul and Spain, in Colchis and Phrygia, as well as survivals at Athens, Marseilles and Rome, are proofs of the development of architecture from rude origins.¹¹

Among the various problems which are intimately bound up with the general development of man, the evolution of the Family is first in human interest. Here the Greeks had abundance of evidence from savage institutions. The pages of Herodotus are full of references to nearly all possible forms of relationship between the sexes, from Lycian mother-right to Thracian suttee, from the reported promiscuity of Agathyrsi to the marriage-market of Babylon. What inferences, it may be asked, were drawn from this rich material ? Herodotus himself is sparing of comment—it does not seem to occur to him that sexual divergencies from the

Hellenic standard may have an historical importance. In describing the custom of the Agathyrsi, he breaks his rule of silence : a community of women arose in order that all men might be brothers—a remark which savours of the moralist rather than the sociologist.¹² It may be questioned, in fact, whether the time of Herodotus was ripe for any theories on human marriage. Aeschylus was certainly interested in the controversy whether a child is nearer akin to his father or his mother, and is sometimes thought to have been conscious of a matrilinear system once obtaining in Athens.¹³ But there is no good evidence that this hypothetical mother-right really existed among the Greeks ; and, even if its existence could be proved for pre-historic Greece, we may well doubt whether Aeschylus was aware of the tradition ; in any case, Herodotus betrays no consciousness. Probably the Greeks were satisfied with the simple assumption that a stage of 'promiscuity' preceded marriage. According to an Athenian myth, marriage was instituted by Cecrops, in whose reign the women of Athens were said to have lost their votes in the assembly, and the children ceased to be called after their mothers.¹⁴ In other parts of Greece the institution of matrimony was ascribed to the example of Zeus and Hera, the first wedded pair, or to the teaching of a culture-goddess like Demeter.¹⁵ Aristotle, whose social organisation began with the Family, was satisfied with monogamy as a starting point—indeed it is remarkable that, in referring to the Cyclopes of Homer, he misquoted the line which gave—or seemed to give—each Cyclops 'wives,'

and read the singular *ἀλόχου* for the plural *ἀλόχων*, no doubt influenced by his own preconceptions.¹⁶

But the common belief in original 'promiscuity' must have been supported by a knowledge of strange varieties in feminine status. By the end of the fifth century, ideas for a Return to Nature were much in the air, and this Return—as we see from Euripides and Aristophanes, and of course from Plato's *Republic* and the Cynics—included a community of wives, as a desirable reform.¹⁷ The reform itself made no appeal to Epicurus, but he had no reason to doubt the fact of original promiscuity. Indeed, until quite recent times, the Epicurean view—translated into modern terms of 'a communal marriage in the horde'—seemed almost self-evident to some modern anthropologists; but opinion now appears to be reverting to Darwin's theory that human marriage is original, and that there has been no primitive stage in which sexual communism has existed as a universal custom.¹⁸ Aristotle, with his Cyclopean family, has turned the tables on Epicurus.

Primitive history was but one of the various problems to which the comparative method could be applied, and the Greeks, who had their own life to live, and were politicians before they became philosophers, were more concerned with present than with palaeolithic man. Of these problems the most important, perhaps, was the controversy on *φύσις* and *νόμος*—the relative values of Nature and Convention. We need not review the course of the long debate, which belongs rather to the history of ethics; but it is

interesting to observe that, although the controversy was no doubt started on physical lines—by the famous pronouncement of Heraclitus that ‘all things are in perpetual motion’—it soon became centred in anthropology. Relativists might contend that if physical matter is in flux, the principles of morality are equally shifting and uncertain; but this philosophical argument was obviously less cogent than the plain fact that moral standards *do* vary among different nations. As Aristotle remarked, fire burns both here and in Persia, whereas Greek manners are different from the Persian. Herodotus was of course the mine from which the most discrepant customs could be quarried in abundance, although the historian himself was cautious enough in drawing inferences from his own material. The variation was patent—no money could induce Greeks to eat their dead relatives, whereas the Kallatiae protested at the idea of burning them¹⁹—and in fact Herodotus goes out of his way to exaggerate the difference between Greek and Egyptian habits; but he does not suggest that custom is ‘conventional’ or opposed to Nature. ‘Custom,’ he says, ‘is king of all.’ There are many such kings (he implies), but all have equal claims within their own territories. He clings to those ‘unwritten laws’ which his friend Sophocles revered as ‘not of to-day or yesterday, and no one knows when they appeared.’

But the sophists—or rather some of those teachers—had no such scruples, and by the end of the century the work of Herodotus had been ransacked for evidence to support the fashionable theory of relativism. A

single and perhaps not very familiar example will suffice—the Doric tract written about 400 B.C. (*Δισσοὶ Λόγοι*), in which the argument for relativism is based on the discrepancy of custom, both among the Greeks themselves, and between Greeks and barbarians, all the foreign instances being taken from Herodotus.²⁰

In later times there was perhaps no school that did not claim support from savage custom. Its variability seemed to the sceptic Pyrrho a conclusive proof that it had no absolute value. Cynics were of course delighted with any scrap of evidence that a primitive life was natural, while the Stoic Chrysippus—‘curious,’ as Cicero says, ‘in every kind of history’—collected funeral rites, to show that all habits are equally ‘indifferent’ to a wise man. From the same facts the Emperor Julian drew a different conclusion, that the variation of law and custom was fatal to the usual monogenistic doctrine of human origins. Aristotle’s example led to a fashion of collecting ‘strange customs’ by those who had no theories to advance, the most conspicuous of such works being compiled by Nicolaus of Damascus in the reign of Augustus; and learned poets, like Apollonius, were proud to show off their knowledge of a barbarian custom such as the *couvade* or some unusual method of sepulture, while they wisely refrained from explaining it.²¹

Unfortunately, the comparative method was liable to abuse: the Greek mind, with its innate love of generalisation, was apt to assume that the limited

observation of a few peoples is good evidence of all mankind ; and so the fifth century fell a victim to that will-o'-the-wisp, the *consensus gentium*—an argument which, for many centuries, accepted vague and sweeping statements in place of accurate investigation. It was seldom that the validity of the argument was challenged, though here and there, in later days, a sceptic like Cotta might pertinently ask 'How do you know the beliefs of other races?' Both Socrates and the sophist Hippias assume the existence of a *consensus* for certain unwritten laws, the wish—at least of Socrates—being father of the proof.²²

And here an interesting question arises: Did Socrates confine himself to generalities, or did he adopt a more stringent method of anthropology? This question has been raised by Prof. J. L. Myres in a brilliant essay which concludes with the following sentence: 'above all, I have ventured to suggest—what I hope it may be for others to carry forward—an inquiry into the anthropological basis of the political doctrine of Socrates.'²³ The evidence on which Mr. Myres apparently relies is in the *Republic*—to quote his own words, 'the annual mating festivals, the κομφοὶ κληῆροι by which status is allotted to each infant after inspection by the governors, the whole classificatory system of relationship are one and all to be found among the curious νόμοι which we know to have been recorded by the anthropologists of the century before.'

With regard to Socrates himself, the evidence is negative. We know that he was interested in domestic

relations, and especially in the position of women ;²⁴ and here, if anywhere, we should expect to find him argue from foreign custom, which would have taught him that the range of feminine activities could be far wider than at Athens, where the house-door was the woman's boundary. Herodotus might have shown him women working on the land ; but, if agriculture was originally a feminine pursuit among the ancestors of the Greeks, as among many other peoples, the fact had been so completely forgotten that Socrates, like Sophocles, would have dismissed a woman labouring in the fields as a mere ' Egyptian,' the direct antithesis of the Greek.²⁵ As Dr. Frazer remarks, the old practice of hoeing in preparation for the seed had been replaced in Europe at a very remote period by the use of the plough, which needs a man's labour ;²⁶ so that the Greeks had good reason to believe that agriculture was a masculine art, dating from the invention of the plough by Triptolemus. Even Plato, who—as we shall see—made women fight, did not suggest that they ever ploughed. Strabo and other writers noted that among certain races, such as the Iberians and Germans, the task of agriculture fell to the women ; but they did not explain the fact as of historical importance. Tacitus simply records that field-work was ' delegated ' to women. Nor did it occur to a Greek that the women's agricultural festival of the Thesmophoria was any evidence in sociology ; if an explanation were needed, it would have been sufficient to point out that the principle of fertility was the same in women as in the fields ; or simply—as in the

Melanippe of Euripides, that women 'have the greatest share' in all religious matters.²⁷

If Socrates neglected the method of sociology, the reason is not far to seek: he preferred to draw his analogies from the lower animals. Here he was on familiar ground; for kinship between man and other animals was an idea as firmly rooted in Greek as in savage belief.

In particular, the philosophers of the fifth century were impressed by the continuity of all animal life. The savage stratum might lie a little lower than the civilised, but the bedrock of human nature must be found in the bird and the bee, the dog and the horse. After all, as Pheidippides asks in the *Clouds*, how do we differ from cocks, except that we have votes? This particular conclusion, of course, would not have commended itself to the real Socrates, though it is laid at the door of the Aristophanic parody of that philosopher; but there is ample proof that the zoological method was accepted by Socrates and his circle, both for physical and moral analogies. To quote Xenophon—who here, at least, is a good authority for Socrates—the need of human training is proved by the example of horses and dogs; again, it is the housewife's duty to live indoors and superintend the slaves, just as the queen bee (according to Ischomachus) stays in the hive and keeps the other bees up to the mark. We are already prepared for the Epicurean view that animals are the mirror of Nature.²⁸

This zoological line of argument is predominant in

the *Republic*. There are, it is true, a few scattered observations on national character other than Greek ; and it is possible that stray inferences—such as the motive for family communism—may have been suggested by a reading of Herodotus. But Plato differs from Herodotus where he might well have borrowed a hint : thus—as Adam notes—his caste-system disagrees with the Egyptian in essentials. Again Plato accepts, in theory, the great Thucydidean principle of survival in culture—indeed he seems actually to borrow from Thucydides in remarking ‘ it is not long since the Greeks held the opinion (still retained by most of the barbarians) that a naked man is an indecent and laughable sight.’²⁹ He definitely admits that the barbarians are older than the Greeks, and preserve the primitive nature worship and the old patriarchal form of government.³⁰ But, in practice, he prefers to argue from the lower animals. The guardians are to be watch-dogs ; human beings must follow the example set by themselves in breeding animals ; the nature of men and women is essentially identical ‘ as in other animals.’³¹

These zoological analogies were perhaps criticised on the publication of the *Republic* ; at all events Aristotle and the Peripatetics refused to accept them as proof of sex-equality in mankind.³² Plato, indeed, was not convinced of error—it is a dogma of the *Laws*, no less than of the *Republic*, that women must on occasion ‘ fight like birds.’ But, in the *Laws*, he seems to feel that if the sexes are to be proved equal the proof must be anthropological ; and accordingly he reviews the masculine habits of women in various parts

of the world—Sarmatians, Thracians, Amazons and Spartans. The argument of a fighting goddess, made in the image of her own sex—perhaps the earliest example of the ‘sociological’ argument in religion—also belongs to Plato’s last period. His treatment of the ‘Drink’ question in the *Laws*, where he reviews a considerable number of races, may also be mentioned as an example of his later use of ethnology.³³

From this evidence we may conclude that Socrates himself was but little concerned with anthropological questions, and that in his earlier period Plato shared his master’s lack of interest, but that, as he broke from the closer Socratic influence, he succumbed to the spell of a method which, for use or misuse, had come to stay. Its misuse was inevitable when it fell into Cynic hands, and Diogenes could justify cannibalism, not merely by an argument from Anaxagoras (that all particles are homogeneous) but by the positive fact that some nations *are* cannibal. Even so, perhaps no great harm was done—Diogenes was not recommending the blameless Athenian to eat his kind, but was simply drawing attention to an observation which has now become a truism, that

‘The wildest dreams of Kew are the facts of Khatmandhu
And the crimes of Clapham chaste in Martaban;’

or—to quote an exact rediscovery of the same idea by another modern writer—that ‘cannibalism is moral in a cannibal country.’³⁴ And, after all, when the Cynic or early Stoic showed at his worst, his example was not the savage, but the pig. If the study of

savage custom led Chrysippus to strange conclusions—he argued that the myth of Oedipus and Jocasta need inspire no horror—his arguments were confessedly drawn from the example of the lower animals, rather than from man; ‘we must look to the beasts’ for Nature. And here again the theory was not meant to be translated into practice: as Origen rightly explained, incest may be ‘indifferent’ to the philosopher, but it is not to be tolerated by society.³⁵

The true defect of the comparative method, as pursued by the Greeks, is not that they went too far, but that they did not go far enough. Although most Greeks (including Stoics) were quite ready to concede that their ancestors were savages, they made no attempt to understand savage modes of thought. No Greek could have ‘got at the back of the Black man’s mind.’ They were quite unable to realise that savages are not philosophers, or that their own savage ancestors were not actuated by the most civilised motives in their strange observances. Of course a barbarian might lose his head and run amok; but if he sat down in a cool hour to elaborate a system of life, the Greeks assumed that this νόμος must have been suggested by the same principles as would occur to the most enlightened Greek law-giver. Plutarch’s answers to his Greek and Roman Questions shew this inability of the philosopher to project himself into the past. The symbols of Pythagoras—really scraps of folklore—were turned into Golden Sayings. In the same undiscerning spirit a folksong is forced to masquerade as an ‘Homeric epigram,’ and Homer himself becomes a philosopher

and an allegorist. Even Longinus, the finest of ancient critics, can blame the *Odyssey* for dealing too much in the marvellous; and it remained for Fontenelle, at the end of the seventeenth century, to divine the real nature of the mythopoeic stage.

Greek anthropology, in fact, suffered no less than Greek religion from the philosophic interpreter. The real motives governing the action of the uncivilised were almost always misunderstood. If Epicurus had realised that in all spheres of savage life the individual counts for nothing and the tribe for everything, he would have avoided the error of the social contract which vitiates his account of early man. If Strabo had known something of the nature of taboo, he would have understood why the kings of the Sabaeans were kept close prisoners in their palaces, and he would not have taken refuge in that last infirmity of the puzzled commentator—the command of an oracle.³⁶ In his own religion, as we are often told, the Greek was a savage as well as a worshipper of Olympians; but, in his interpretation, he had forgotten the savage and was altogether on the side of the Olympians.

But the limitations of Greek anthropology should not blind us to its real merits. Once for all, the Greeks learnt, and taught mankind, the nature of man. The lesson was not easy. It was long before they could learn to desert the smooth and pleasant ways of the Myth for the rougher path of Science. To the poet, the artist, and the religious teacher the Myth was essential, and permanent; but, if the world owes most to their expression of the Greek genius, it also owes

much to those Greeks in whose eyes the Myth was a stumbling-block. The history of Greek anthropology is the gradual substitution of experience for the mythical—the growing recognition of Order and Law in the realm of human life, as well as in the external world. Progress was slow, for to the last there were always back-sliders—a Ctesias or a Megasthenes, who reverted to the mythical under the thin disguise of History, or a Pliny, whose seventh Book well illustrates the readiness of the most cultured Romans to lapse into childish credulity. Long after Aristotle had shown the specific nature of man, Lucretius and even Galen found it necessary to protest against the popular belief in Centaurs, and other semi-human monsters.³⁷ But, in the main, the forward movement was uninterrupted and continuous, from the first steps of Herodotus, with his rather halting protest against the Myth, to the scientific outlook of Aristotle, the common-sense of Epicurus, and the triumph of Reason in Posidonius and Strabo.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN AND RISE OF MAN

NOWHERE, perhaps, in the history of Greek thought is the absence of dogma more conspicuous than in the complete freedom with which the Greeks approached the initial question of human origins.

The Israelite, starting with the conception of an absolute Creator, found a ready answer—the maker of the Universe must have made Man. But the early Greeks—with the exception of the Orphics—were but little interested in myths of Creation, such as so often appeal to savage fancy, nor did they require a personal god to bring cosmos out of chaos.¹ Their gods were themselves sprung from the pre-existent universe; and, while it could logically be held that the gods first appeared, and then made man, it was as easy to suppose that both gods and man arose independently from some elemental source. As a matter of fact, both these views may be found in the Epic poetry. The Homeric title of Zeus, ‘Father of men and gods,’ proves a belief that man’s origin is, in some way, dependent on the gods, but does not show whether Zeus is to be regarded as a physical father,

or a Creator, or simply—as Aristotle interpreted—a patriarchal King. A passage in the *Odyssey*, in which Father Zeus is reproached for not pitying men when he begets them, is in favour of physical paternity; but in the *Works and Days*, the men of Bronze and the Heroes were ‘made’ by Zeus, while the men of the Gold and Silver Ages were made by the earlier gods, who lived in the time of Cronos.² To complicate matters, both Homer and Hesiod preserve traces of a quite different belief; Homer calls Oceanus ‘the genesis of all’—an idea which seems to anticipate the speculations of Thales on the origin of the world—and Hesiod attributes the birth of gods and men to a common source (*ὁμόθεν*), more clearly defined by Pindar: ‘the race of men and of gods is one; we both draw breath from one mother.’³

Thus, as an alternative to the conception of an All-Father, or Maker, the early Greek could adopt the theory of an All-Mother, the Earth, from whose womb men are sprung, and to whose bosom they must return. Later philosophers tended to substitute a more impersonal soul of the Universe in place of the old personal Earth-goddess; but this pantheism had little effect on the popular conception. Plato, whose religious system required a Creator—a First Cause transcending the visible powers of Nature—acquiesced in the traditional mythology so far as to allow that Earth was the first and eldest of the gods created by the Demiurgus.⁴

To nature-worshippers like the Greeks, the motherhood of Earth was the readiest explanation of human existence; for, until the Atomists denied that the

Earth was divine, or even living, the difficulty of assuming the production of a sentient animal from non-sentient matter did not arise : the Earth was alive and could give life from—and indeed by—herself. For, in Hesiod, Earth is the ultimate principle, the sole ἀρχή of existing things ; she bore Uranos, the Heaven, without a male partner, although the poet obscurely hints at a masculine element in Love, who belongs to the same primeval order.⁵ As, however, Greek nature-worship could with difficulty dispense with the notion of sex, Earth found a partner in her own son ; and gods and men arose from this marriage of Heaven and Earth—the world-wide conception which has left so many traces of its influence in Greek poetry, and (after a process of rationalism by Anaxagoras) served Lucretius as a sufficient explanation for the origin of living things.⁶ The Orphics, who believed that the human race sprang from the ashes of the earth-born Titans,⁷ seem to have been prouder of their father Heaven than of their mother Earth, and liked to emphasise the γένος οὐράνιον ; but popular folklore laid stress on Earth, who is practically regarded as the sole parent of original men (αὐτόχθονες). According to Hesiod—to quote only a few instances of this common belief—Pelagus, the ancestor of the earliest Peloponnesians, was autochthonous, and the Epic poet Asios calls him not only the first Arcadian but the first man : ‘ the black earth produced the godlike Pelagus on the high mountains, that the race of mortals might exist.’ Pausanias, in the last ages of Paganism, readily accepts this tradition, although,

with painful accuracy, he adds that the earth must have borne others at the same time, for Pelagus could not have been a king without subjects.⁸ The Athenians, in particular, insisted on their autochthonous birth : their legendary founders, Cecrops and Erechtheus, were sprung from the soil, and their poets and panegyrists are full of allusions to this honourable descent ; only a few scoffers, at a later date, belittled an origin which man shared with snails and cabbages.⁹

The birthplace of the first man (or men) was localised in various parts of the Greek or barbarian world, for the Greeks, though sometimes assigning priority to their own race,¹⁰ were not insensible to the claims of other nations. In Greece itself there were different traditions ; according to the Argive legend, Phoroneus (the son of the river-god Inachus) was the first man, and it was he, and not Prometheus, who gave fire.¹¹ An interesting fragment from a lyric poet (possibly Pindar) mentions other accounts : that the Boeotian Alalcomeneus first sprang from the Copaic sea ; that the first men were the Curetes of Ida, or the Phrygian Corybantes ; that Arcadia produced Pelagus ' before the moon ' ; and that the human race arose in Libya or Egypt, from the fields or (in Egypt) from the fertile mud of the Nile.¹² After recording these discrepant myths, the poet not unnaturally adds the comment that ' it is hard to discover the truth.'

The birth of primitive man from trees, especially the ash and oak, is merely a specific form of the general belief in autochthonous origin. In the lyric fragment above-mentioned the Corybantes are *δενδροφύεις*,

‘tree-like,’ as if man at first retained traces of his parentage. A familiar instance of tree-birth occurs in the *Ages* of Hesiod, where the Third or Bronze race is made by Zeus from ash-trees, the idea of spontaneous generation being ‘contaminated’ with that of divine creation.¹³

The parallel conception of birth from stones is best known from the myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha, who replenished the human race by a miracle worked with stones. This, however, is not the spontaneous act of the earth; the stones are only the material used by Zeus, who thus creates mankind. But the myth is interesting from another point of view: only the common people (*λαοί*) are created from stone (*λᾶας*), whereas Deucalion himself is the son of Prometheus, i.e. of divine parentage. It seems to have been felt that the great gulf between the heroes and ordinary folk could only be explained by a difference of origin, the distinction being well illustrated by the myth of the Aeginetan ant-men:¹⁴ Aeacus, the ancestor of a famous clan, himself the son of Zeus and Aegina, grew up alone on his mother’s island, until ‘the Father of men and gods’ turned all the ants of the place into men and women, to be his companions and subjects. As in the myth of Deucalion and many other legends, the origin of men is here not ‘spontaneous,’ but the act of a god; and there is a difference between the lineage of the noble family, who are descended from a god (*δῖοι*, *διογενεῖς*), and the common people who are only created.

There remains the well-known myth of Prometheus,

who created men from clay. This account, though popular in late Greek and Roman times, is not found in Homer or Hesiod, nor in any literature earlier than the end of the fifth century ; but similar myths occur among Babylonians, Hebrews, Egyptians, and various savage tribes, and the Greek form (localised at Panopeus) has all the appearance of antiquity.¹⁵ But the Hesiodic Prometheus is not the maker of mankind, and the clay is only used for the moulding of Pandora, the first woman, who brought misfortune on man. Primitive folklore—and the myth of Pandora is certainly primitive—feels no difficulty in the existence of a single sex. Even Plato, in his more imaginative moods, could suggest that, when the earth bore men spontaneously, there was no need of women and children.¹⁶

It is most probable that the two theories which present the sharpest contrast—the beliefs in autochthonous man and in his creation by or descent from gods—represent views originally held by two different races. The pre-Achaean ‘Pelasgians,’ dwellers from time immemorial in the land of Greece, might fitly claim to be descended from the Earth—there is significance in the Arcadian tradition of Pelasgus—but the Achaean invaders had no such reverence for a newly conquered land. For them the gods of Olympus were supreme ; their own chieftains claimed heroic ancestry, and the heroes were children of the gods. With the fusion of the conquering and conquered races, the two types of belief persisted side by side, ultimately becoming alternatives between which the choice was almost

immaterial, so that there are traces of both in Homer and Hesiod alike. But Homer shows that the Achæan noble did not forget his divine lineage—he was not descended from a stock or stone, as Penelope courteously remarks to a distinguished-looking stranger, like a common earth-born Pelasgian. In particular, the *amours* of Zeus are not so much due to the low morality of his worshippers, as to the claim of the various Achæan lords to be descended from their chief god.

The persistence of this belief in divine parentage throughout classical times—still intelligible to a modern Greek peasant, whose grandmother may be a Nereid¹⁷—is not without direct bearing on Greek anthropology. Greek genealogies were short. Hecataeus told the Egyptian priests, with pardonable pride, that his ancestor in the sixteenth generation was a god; and, although his hearers dashed this conceit by pointing to a series of statues which represented human generations for some thousands of years, aristocratic families agreed with Hecataeus rather than Herodotus, who, in telling this story, observes that *he* did not ‘genealogise himself.’ It followed that, while the human race itself might have existed for countless ages, the particular cycle represented by the Greeks was of very recent date. Deucalion’s Flood was only three hundred years before the sack of Troy; and the stages of social evolution—nomadic, agricultural, and political—had to be compressed within a very narrow compass of time.¹⁸

In philosophy, it is true, the belief in the divine

origin of man became a doctrine of high ethical value, as we see from its development by the Stoics, for whom the fatherhood of Zeus—rationalised or spiritualised—was the corner-stone of a great religious edifice. But, in its lower phases, the notion did little but minister to the vanity of the aristocrat, or (in later times) to the political purposes of the despot. For good or evil, however, it was ingrained in the Greek mind, even if, during the period of Enlightenment, educated Athenians (as Plato says) might laugh at such old wives' tales.

Plato himself was of their company ; for though his own family was 'divine' on both sides, he was more than a little incredulous of his exalted lineage, to judge from a sarcasm which has curiously escaped some of his commentators : 'we must accept the statements of the ancients [about the gods], who were, as they said, the children of gods, and I imagine knew the truth about their own ancestors. One cannot disbelieve the sons of gods, although it is true that they speak without probable or convincing proof.' Plato, if an aristocrat, was first and foremost a philosopher, to whom pride of birth was mere foolishness, when 'every man, whether Greek or barbarian, has had countless myriads of ancestors, rich and poor, kings and slaves.' But, by an ironical revenge of fate, the philosopher was refuted in his own lineage—his nephew Speusippus, not content with the remoter descent of the family from Poseidon, believed (or at least recorded a belief) that his great relative was the actual son of Apollo.¹⁹

From divine sonship to divinity itself there is an easy transition. Even in the fifth century the mystic

Empedocles posed as a man-god, like a savage medicine-man ; and, if a philosopher could make the boast, the deity of a monarch such as Alexander or Demetrius Poliorcetes was still more readily accepted. Indeed, at a time when the human limitations of a god were quite as prominent as his superhuman qualities, the deification of a king added little to his royal prerogatives.²⁰ It is to their credit that the Athenians, including Demosthenes, protested on religious grounds against what was, at least politically, an innovation ; but the opposition was overborne, and even Demosthenes agreed, with some contempt, to recognise Alexander as the son of Zeus, or of Poseidon if he preferred. The royal tutor, Aristotle, had already taught that between god and king there was no great line of demarcation. After this, it seems rare modesty, or a strong sense of humour, for Antigonos, the father of Demetrius, to disclaim divine parentage, with the remark (in effect) that no man is a god to his own valet.²¹

With regard to the state of primitive man, there was one tradition which was not only first in the field but continued to be influential long after doubt had been thrown on its literal truth. Hesiod's doctrine of the Ages—from Gold to Iron—appealed to theologians like Plato, and especially to those who believed in the creation of man ; for, though the gods of Hesiod were neither faultless nor omnipotent, they were at least 'blessed,' and must have intended their original creatures to be happy. The myth appealed no less to the historical sense of the Greeks, for it embodied a

dim record of past prosperity in the Aegean civilisation ; and it contained at least a perverted version of the truth. For the Age of Bronze—the third race of man, who delighted in war and were the first to eat animal food—not only marks degeneracy in the scale of metals, but identifies the race with an actual stage of culture. ‘ They had bronze weapons, and bronze houses, and worked with bronze tools ; there was no black iron.’ The author of the *Ages* was of course perfectly well aware of the fact that bronze preceded iron in the history of civilisation. Although iron must have begun to come into common use by the tenth century, if not earlier, the priority of bronze was established by Homer’s constant references to the use of bronze for weapons, utensils, and house decoration ; and Hesiod must himself have lived at the end of this transitional period. Long after Hesiod, the iron-smith retained the old name of ‘ bronze-worker ’ (χαλκεύς) ; and, even in the sixth century, iron was still new enough to excite surprise and admiration,²² just as, centuries before, the marvels of bronze workmanship had been ascribed to a cunning magician. Later Greeks, and the Romans, following Greek tradition, assume the priority of the Bronze Age as a matter beyond doubt ; and few could have been misled by Seneca’s rhetorical assertion that iron was discovered before bronze.²³

The Bronze Age should naturally have been followed by that of Iron, but Hesiod was obliged to find room for the Heroes of Epic tradition. They could not be placed before the men of Bronze, as Greek genealogies knew no break between the Heroes and the present

race of men ; on the other hand, the heroic age could not be rated as low as the third race, of whose morals Hesiod had so poor an opinion—the Heroes are ‘juster’ and ‘nobler.’ Hesiod therefore assumes a break in the continuity of degeneration ; the Heroes revert to a better type than that of their immediate predecessors. But, after this temporary check, man proceeds again on his downward path. The race of Iron—in which Hesiod deplures that his own lot is cast—is full of crime and violence ; and the evil will yet further increase, until at last, when degeneration has gone so far that ‘men will be born with grey hair on their temples,’ the race will be destroyed. This remarkable prediction has been explained as due to the fear of invasion by a fair-haired people like the Gauls. If so, the reference would be obscure, even for a prophecy ; but, from a comparison with Plato’s *Politicus* (in which men are born grey-haired, at the end of a world-cycle) it has been rightly inferred that Hesiod here contemplates a cyclic process of the universe.²⁴

Perhaps no feature of Greek thought is more characteristic than the Cyclic theory, which remained without a rival until it was finally rejected by the Christians ; for, as Augustine protested, *semel Christus mortuus est*.²⁵ In different hands it took various shapes, and is often implicit rather than explicit ; but, in one form or another, it permeates all Greek conceptions of religion, philosophy, and history alike, and its effect in limiting the idea of Progress is the chief hindrance to the development of ancient anthropology. More than one cause may well have contributed to

this belief, which is, in part, a survival from primitive thought. In regard to human life, a savage does not easily grasp the conception of new generations following each other in infinite succession. He seems rather to think that the sum-total of life in his community is limited by a series of births and re-births.²⁶ The doctrine of metempsychosis—so important in Greek religious thought—is itself an inheritance from the savage belief in a fixed number of souls which preserve the tribe or race by constant reincarnation; and there can be little doubt that this cycle of re-births (κύκλος γενέσεων) has left other traces of its influence in Greek folklore. Again, in respect of the external world, we must remember that early thought does not share the modern conception of Time: a day, for instance, has a material entity of its own; it is, in a manner, a concrete personality and living thing, with a character for good or evil; and the fact that it has once passed is no proof that it will not recur—indeed it is bound to recur in the following year. The interchange of day and night, the phases of the moon, the regular cycle of seasons, the birth, decay, and renewal of vegetation, must all have suggested the inference that human life is equally periodic—that ‘there is nothing new under the sun.’²⁷ So far the Greeks seem to have inherited the common property of earlier thought; but they added something of their own genius. The Greek mind loved Order, and visualised it as a circle, an enclosing limit or *πέρας*; and the Pythagoreans (whose cycles were repeated

to the smallest particular) carried this conception to the extent of identifying the finite with virtue, the infinite with vice. A limitless evolution was outside the range of Greek ideas—life may have its flow, but the ebb must follow the flow in a process of perpetual alternation.

Hesiod wished that 'he had died before, or had been born after' his own age—a further proof that he looked forward to a better time, when

‘The world’s great age begins anew.’

But it must be confessed that this optimistic belief, which appears to mitigate the profound pessimism of Hesiod, has no practical value for humanity. His own generation and its latest descendants could have no part in the Coming Race. It was well that Greek anthropology went on its way uninfluenced, in the main, by the logical conclusion of this depressing creed. Although even the most enlightened Greeks had but little faith in the future progress of the race, they could at least maintain that man had not degenerated but progressed in the past, and that the wheel of progress had not yet begun its inevitable recoil.

Such thinkers found no support from Hesiod. How far they were aided by popular tradition, on lines other than the Hesiodic, is a question difficult to answer. Greek mythology is full of stories about some hero who taught mankind the rudimentary arts of culture. For example Phoroneus not only gave fire, but caused men to exchange a state of

isolation for a social life. Again, the Arcadian history of civilisation, from Pelasgus to Arcas, is a genuine piece of folklore, to account for man's progress from a diet of acorns, a clothing of skins, and a dwelling in huts, to a knowledge of agriculture and other arts.²⁸ This looks like a 'rational' description of human progress, and seems to be independent of the Golden Age. But even here Pausanias suggests that the primitive Arcadians were just and pious and shared the tables of the gods—an obvious concession to Hesiod. In any case, these and similar folktales are so inextricably confused with divine agency that we can at most regard them as attempts to lay stress on the material rise of man rather than on his moral decline. They do not themselves prove an early belief that progress was original and entirely due to human endeavours, but they show that the seed of future rationalism would find a congenial soil.

The steps of this rationalism, in connection with the belief in human progress, must be very briefly traced. We find at least the germs of it in the sixth century, when Xenophanes brushes aside all the gracious myths that make man directly dependent on the favour of gods or heroes, and substitutes man's own gradual experience. 'The gods did not reveal all things to men from the beginning, but in course of time they find out, by searching, what is better.' An 'anticatastrophist' in geology—for the cyclic changes of earth and water in his physical system are slow processes—he consistently applies the same principle to human life, rejecting any rapid *καταστροφή*

such as the sudden change effected by a divine or heroic teacher.

Aeschylus was in a different position. He had to work on a myth, whose essence was the gift of civilisation by a god—not indeed Olympian, but Titanic. He diverged from Hesiod by eliminating the Golden Age—there is not a word in the *Prometheus* to suggest man's primitive happiness—but he could not, even if he wished, neglect the theological element in the myth, as the Titan god had a real place in the Athenian religion of the fifth century. Later on, the myth was rehandled by Protagoras, who could hardly have believed in its literal truth, since he maintained a purely agnostic attitude with regard to the very existence of the gods. But the legend of Prometheus was a convenient peg on which to hang a sophistic lecture about primitive man, 'naked, shoeless, without bed or weapon,' who gradually acquired, first the mechanical, and then the political arts.

Even Sophocles is tinged with the rationalism of his age. In the splendid chorus of the *Antigone* he develops the theme 'many things are wonderful, but nothing is more wonderful than man,' who has subdued sea and land, and has tamed bird and beast for his service. Sophocles was indeed a 'religious' poet, and would not have denied man's ultimate dependence on God; but he tacitly ignores the culture-god, and seems to suggest that man at least worked out his own salvation.

Euripides, 'the Rationalist,' in a play written

about twenty years later than the *Antigone*, appears at first sight to return to the culture-god. 'I thank,' says Theseus in the *Supplikes*, 'whatever god it was that ordered our life from a confused and bestial state, first implanting Intelligence (σύνεσιν), and then giving us a tongue, the messenger of language.' But for Euripides himself—though not of course for his dramatic character Theseus—the god, 'whatever god it was,' who gave intelligence is a figure almost stripped of the last garment of mythology; he is Intelligence in the abstract, the νοῦς of Anaxagoras, the σύνεσις whose Euripidean godhead is the jest of Aristophanes.

If Euripides was forced to be prudent, there was no need of caution at the end of the century, when Critias—the 'tyrant' who combined a love of literature with a lust for murder—expressed his cynical view of human history: primitive men lived the life of a savage, and might was right, until law was invented by some wise man to punish violence; but, as crimes still continued, another sage introduced the idea of gods who should take vengeance on the undetected criminal. Such outspoken atheism was a sign of the troubled times when Athens was in the last throes of the Peloponnesian war; later, when peace and order had returned, the tragic poet Moschion, less bigoted than Critias, preserves an open mind on the origin of civilisation. It might have been Prometheus, or Necessity, or Nature, who taught men, at first cave-dwellers and cannibals, to learn by practice and gradual habit.²⁹

Meanwhile, there was a revulsion to the old Hesiodic doctrine of the Golden Age. Plato, in particular, falls a ready victim to the glamour of a time when 'the ancients were better than ourselves and nearer the gods.'³⁰ It was easy to make this view consistent with the theory of Ascent by combining it with cyclical degeneration and restoration, and also by bringing into play the common Greek myth that the present human race has been almost exterminated by deluge and other catastrophes.

Like Herodotus, Plato found the long record of Egyptian civilisation a corrective to Greek chronology, and he realised that behind the earliest Egyptian annals there lay an immense period of uncivilised life. In the *Timæus* a priest of Neith calls the Greeks 'children,' with no hoary traditions, but content to believe in a single deluge; whereas Egypt alone has been exempt from frequent catastrophes, and the few survivors have had 'to begin all over again.' Starting with this assumption, Plato sketches the probable development of civilisation after the last periodical deluge, when only a few mountain-shepherds survived—'small sparks of the human race'—with a few herds of cattle or goats. These shepherds were rude and unlettered men, and had lost the implements of civilisation. But, although they could not work the metals, they had no lack of clothing or houses; the plastic and weaving arts need no iron, and God has given these arts to man in his direst necessity. They had milk and flesh in abundance (the shepherds are no vegetarians),

and, being neither rich nor poor, had no cause for envy or bloodshed. No written law existed, but men lived 'by custom and the so-called laws of their fathers,' in a patriarchal government, like the Cyclopes. Plato then describes the formation of cities, which arose from a single common dwelling at the foot of mountains, enclosed with walls to keep off wild animals. The patriarchal laws of each family gave place to a common law, by a process of selection. Gradually, as men forgot the deluge, cities were built in the plains and finally on the very sea-shore.³¹

The Golden Age remained as a motive for poetic fancy, and eked out a rather precarious existence in Stoic philosophy; but it was too obviously mythological to suit the Peripatetics, although at least one of these—Dicaearchus—tried to interpret it by the light of common sense, eliminating or explaining away the more fabulous element. Both Aristotle and Theophrastus followed Plato in laying stress on periodic catastrophes. It was an article of Peripatetic faith that the human race had no origin—a belief which is not only the natural outcome of the cyclical theory, but is suggested by the old difficulty of deciding precedence between the egg and the bird.³²

But, if man is eternal, how are we to account for the recent growth of arts, without which life is impossible? Opponents of the Peripatetics inferred that the human race is of recent origin (*ὀψίγονον*); but Aristotle and Theophrastus met the difficulty by Plato's solution of the cyclical loss, invention, and

recovery of the arts.³³ In the present cycle of human existence the arts have been almost entirely recovered : with an assurance strangely falsified by modern science, Aristotle remarks that 'almost everything has been invented.' To him, as to the Epicureans, the world was very old and the present order had almost, if not entirely, reached the summit beyond which there was the prospect, or rather the certainty, of decline.

For this narrowness of outlook, the cyclical theory is no doubt largely to blame ; but it is possible to over-estimate its influence. Disbelief in progress was more deeply rooted. Greece was decaying, not only politically but intellectually, even if the greatness of Aristotle himself reminds us of what the Greek genius was still capable. History, no less than philosophy, pointed to a decline : the men that fought at Marathon had been succeeded by the vanquished at Chaeronea ; and there was no trend of thought to serve as a counter stimulus. If we examine the genesis and development of the modern belief (itself by no means unchallenged) in a continuous upward progress, we find that it is mainly the product of two forces, one political, the other scientific. On the political side, the ideas that led to the French Revolution, and the effect of the Revolution itself, suggested to Condorcet (after Turgot) 'the perfectibility of the human race.' His study of the past had shown him that man had risen ; and, in the light of the new Awakening, he saw no reason to doubt that the progress, if slow, would continue indefinitely,

as long as our own planet endured.³⁴ It is needless to point out how Shelley and Comte—to mention no others—were inspired by their interpretation of history to speculate on still further progress in man's social and moral condition. This optimism was on the whole reinforced by the gradual acceptance of evolutionary ideas: the doctrine of natural selection seemed clearly to indicate that the physical and mental improvement of the race would be continuous. We must of course remember that the law of decay is no less universal than the law of growth, and that it may affect not only an individual nation but the whole course of civilisation. But it can be replied that, while races perish, new nations arise from the ashes of the old, to carry on the torch of life. Even those who lay stress on civilisation as a recurrent phenomenon admit that a new race brings vitality to a decadent culture; and, although a good case has been made out for such revolutions in the past history of mankind, there is no reason to believe that this cyclical process must be permanent.³⁵ Certain arts, no doubt, will continue to rise, flourish and decay; but the conditions of life have been so entirely altered by modern science, that the main stream of civilisation need not be retarded by back-eddies in its onward course.

Objections to the theory of Progress have been raised on physical as well as biological grounds. Modern science has never agreed with Lucretius that the world is already 'effete,' but it has pointed out that the earth's existence, as a habitable planet,

must be limited. In quite recent years, however, the probable limit has been enormously extended by the advancement of physical knowledge (in connection with radio-activity), so that the human race has reason to expect a reprieve for many ages, during which improvement may be effected by the evolution of new races or the social betterment of the old.

Neither watchword—Revolution or Evolution—had any meaning for Aristotle. He was saved from pessimism by his teleology: Nature aimed at the best; but Nature had already attained her end in Man, as a rational and political animal. Man had existed for all time, and it would be absurd to suppose that he had not yet found his perfect growth. And if political progress could go no further than the city state, racial progress seemed equally to stop with the Greek people. Aristotle could not call in new races to redress the balance of the old. It is true that the Greeks did not regard a race as altogether fixed and unalterable; on the contrary, Herodotus and Thucydides allowed free scope for growth by expansion and absorption, and, as we shall see, a racial character might be changed either by habit or climate. But, in spite of these concessions, the Greeks seem to have been more impressed by the essential continuity of race than by its fluidity.

Interested as they were in eugenics within the limits of a race, and continually discussing how far the individual could be improved by breeding or

training, they failed to grasp the possibilities of inter-racial improvement—the evolution of new breeds by the admixture of blood. The sharp division between Greek and barbarian prevented a wide outlook on the range of human development, by restricting the idea of fusion. We know that the results of fusion differ enormously according to conditions which, however, are still obscure: one admixture of blood may produce a virile stock; another, a degenerate type of half-caste. But the Greeks would hardly have conceived of the former alternative. The Greek race, whether in its rise or decline, would never cease to be Greek. So far, a race, like a species, was fixed and incapable of evolution; and as Plato and Aristotle identified civilisation with the Greek race, the decay of Greece would carry with it the decay of civilisation.

CHAPTER III

PHILOSOPHIC ANTHROPOLOGY

IT is a far cry from the speculations of epic poetry and early folklore to Greek philosophy—not, perhaps, in actual achievement, but in the spirit that animated Thales and his successors. The Ionian philosophers had no more method than the poets; they ‘guessed,’ and their guesses—in the light of modern knowledge—were often wild and even absurd. But they were so far scientific in that they subordinated pure imagination to reason, and tried to construct a model of the universe without recourse to mythical or popular tradition.

During the earliest period of philosophy it was inevitable that speculation should be mainly occupied with the universe rather than with man, in spite of—or indeed because of—the humanism which we rightly associate with Greek thought. Human nature was familiar, in comparison with the mystery of the external world, and it was only after repeated efforts to read the riddle of the universe that the Greeks turned to the proper study of mankind.¹ The point needs no demonstration, since everybody

knows that Greek philosophy, before Socrates, is almost entirely physical.

When the Ionians diverged into anthropological paths, their speculations seem to be the natural corollaries of their physics. The first attempt of the philosophy to explain life is attributed to Anaximander, and his biology is a direct consequence of his physical theory, that the prime substance (*τὸ ἀπειρον*) is moist. Animals arose 'in the moist,' under the influence of evaporation from the sun. They were covered by a kind of prickly bark or integument, and, as they grew older, emerged on to dry land; but, after the bark had broken off, they only survived a short time. Anaximander was clearly trying to meet the obvious criticism that, if life originated in water, animals would find a difficulty in adapting themselves to a new environment; and—on the assumption of fixed species—he could only suppose that the first individuals in each species were imperfectly adapted, while their descendants were successful in acquiring terrestrial habits. But this explanation (he must have felt) was inadequate to account for the human species; 'other animals soon found food for themselves, while man alone needs long nursing; hence, if he had been such as he is now, he would not have survived.' The difficulty—neglected by most Greeks, who were content to assume the original birth of adults—was met by Anaximander's ingenious hypothesis that the first men grew up in fishes or animals very like fishes, until puberty was reached; 'then the fish burst,

and men and women emerged who could now nourish themselves.' These foster-parents (according to Plutarch's testimony) appear to have been sharks; and it is possible that Anaximander was familiar with the structure of the viviparous *mustelus levis*, the function of whose yolk-sac was so well described by Aristotle. An observation of this sort, however, seems more suitable to a trained biologist, like Aristotle, than to a sixth-century philosopher, and Plutarch may possibly have falsified the tradition of Anaximander by crediting him with later knowledge. Plutarch himself followed Aristotle in believing that sharks let their young in and out of their bodies, as a protection, so that their young have, as it were, a second birth.²

Anaximander's theory has been regarded by some as a mere semi-mythological guess—a reminiscence of monsters like Dagon or Derceto, or Oannes (Ea) the Assyrian man-fish; by others, as a brilliant, if premature, anticipation of Darwin. The truth seems to lie midway. His view was based on real observation, even if this went no further than the change of the tadpole into the frog, or of the chrysalis into the butterfly. On the other hand, he certainly did not contemplate the evolution of the human species through a long line of intermediate forms.³

Those who search for 'anticipations' can find a much stronger case in Empedocles, curious as it may be that a poet, half-mystic and miracle-monger, should have attained a scientific vision denied to Anaxagoras or Aristotle. But the fact remains that,

in more aspects than one, this extraordinary man came nearer to modern thought than any of his fore-runners or successors. Some of his doctrines may indeed be regarded as the property of other Greek biologists, as, for example, his insistence that there is no hard line of distinction between plant and animal—that both are equally ‘living,’ and, further, that plants have sensation and even intelligence.⁴ No doubt a belief in the intelligence of plants was largely the result of a confusion (shared by Anaxagoras) between vital function and consciousness;⁵ but for Empedocles, at least, there was an additional argument from his doctrine of metempsychosis, whereby a soul could inhabit a plant as well as an animal. In any case, his statement that hair, leaves, feathers, and scales ‘are the same thing’ shows that he took a broad view of biology, and prepares us for his special account of living things, as due to a process of evolution. Briefly, this process is cyclical, and in four stages, which form two distinct periods:

(1) Single parts of animals arose separately: ‘many heads grew without necks, and arms wandered bare and lacking shoulders; eyes roamed in solitude, wanting foreheads.’

(2) These parts united, first at random, thus forming monstrosities, such as man-headed oxen. Only those creatures survived to which chance had given a favourable structure; the monsters perished. Although this process belonged to the past, Empedocles seems certainly to have believed—according to

Aristotle's testimony—that the elimination of the unfit is equally operative in the present.⁶

(3) There arose 'τύποι οὐλοφυεῖς,' 'forms of a whole nature,' i.e. creatures with no distinction of sex. They sprang from earth and water, and were brought to life by the agency of terrestrial fire.

(4) The sexes were now distinguished, and animals reproduced their kind by generation. According to Prof. Burnet, the differentiation of species also belongs to this stage; but this does not appear from the fragments of Empedocles, who speaks only of sex—the τύποι seems to have included animal species. However, Empedocles could not have laid great stress on the original fixity of species; since he accounts for the existence of vertebrates by an explanation (childish enough in itself), that the backbone 'happened to be broken owing to the contorted position of the foetus in the womb.'⁷

Of these four stages, the first two belong to the period in which Love is entering the world and combining the scattered members; in the next two stages, clearly representing the evolution of the present world, Strife enters and Love begins to pass out. The first process is one of aggregation; the second, of differentiation. At the end of the two periods of Love and Strife, living creatures cannot exist; Love finally combines all the elements in a single mass, and Strife, in its turn, completely separates them. As the present human race belongs to a backward process, it is not surprising to find that

Empedocles believed in the degeneracy of men, who are as babies compared with their first ancestors. His ideal Age was a time under the rule of Cypris (Love), in which men were vegetarians.

Ancient critics found it an easy task to ridicule the patent absurdities in this system. The grotesque idea that single parts arose separately and formed organisms by chance, was of course condemned by Aristotle, who pointed out that the parts could not survive in isolation, nor, if they were living things in themselves, could they combine so as to become a single organism.⁸ Lucretius, while accepting the second stage of Empedocles—that Nature at first gave birth to defective creatures—ignored the first stage, in which the separate parts preceded the organism.⁹ As far as Plato and Aristotle are concerned, the chief objection lay in the neglect of teleology. In modern times Empedocles has suffered, no less than Anaximander, from indiscriminate praise and depreciation alike. Some writers have denied that there is any feature in the 'four stages' which can be called evolutionary; Zeller argues that there was an absolute break between each of these stages—one form of life is replaced, not succeeded, by another.¹⁰ It may be admitted that there is a break between the two *periods* during which life is impossible; but, within each period, evolution is plainly intended. In the one period, separate limbs evolve into an organic whole; in the other, sexless forms evolve into male and female. It is curious that Empedocles should be denied even

as much idea of evolution as the Australian tribe of Arunta, who believe that mankind was developed out of formless creatures possessing no distinct limbs or organs of sense. These were shaped into men by two divine beings—a mixture (as Dr. Frazer notes) of evolution and creation.¹¹ We need not suppose that Empedocles borrowed his conception from some old piece of folklore, ultimately derived from uncivilised thought; but we may at least credit the Greek philosopher with no less intuition than the savage. We may go further, and allow that Empedocles was much more than a random guesser—that he was a real evolutionist, who grasped, in a measure, the principle of natural selection. No doubt his law—if he had formulated it—would have been ‘the survival of the fit’ rather than ‘the survival of the fittest’;¹² he contemplated the extinction of amorphous monsters, not the struggle for life between different species, or between members of the same species. But his position, however inadequate, was a permanent gain to biology, and leaders of modern scientific thought, while properly pointing out the difference between unverified hypothesis and experimental proof, have done full justice to the earliest forerunner of Darwin. ‘The selection theory’—to quote Weismann—‘enables us to understand that there is a continual production of what is non-purposive as well as of what is purposive, but the purposive alone survives while the non-purposive perishes in the very act of arising. This is the old wisdom taught long ago by Empedocles.’¹³ The word ‘purposive’

may be considered too strong, for the Greeks had not yet fully realised the argument from Design, and the Empedoclean cause of Evolution is Chance. But although Chance prevails in particulars, there is a general purpose in the world of Empedocles—it is the ‘purpose’ of Love to combine, of Strife to separate.

His other intuition—or guess, if that term is preferred—that species are evolved by favourable variation, was never assimilated by Greek thought: the idea simply fell flat, like the equally great conception of Aristarchus, that the earth is not the centre of the universe, but revolves round the sun; and no philosopher departed from the orthodox belief in the permanence of species. Aristotle himself remarked that if men and quadrupeds were earth-born (a theory which he does not accept) they must have come into being either from a worm (scolex) or an egg, and adds that an origin from a scolex is more probable. But this view does not imply a gradual development of man from some low organism, by successive intermediate stages, as some modern interpreters seem to explain. He was quite clear that all species are separate, and not related by descent from any common ancestor; but, in view of Anaximander’s objection that the human species is not self-supporting at birth, he was willing to allow that the original stage resembled the life of a larva.¹⁴ Epicurus was content with the crude idea that there were ‘wombs’ in the earth, from which the human race were born as infants, and were nourished by a kind of natural milk.¹⁵

Empedocles can be said to have advanced Greek anthropology by emphasising man's relation to other living things, and by adumbrating a theory of evolution on lines which, compared with the popular belief, may be called rationalistic. But in theology he was not a rationalist; and his adherence to the Golden Age does not permit us to class him among the most progressive philosophers of the fifth century. For the really vital influence on Greek, and especially Athenian thought, we must look to Anaxagoras.

Although not Athenian by birth, this great thinker lived and taught for many years at Athens, enjoying the protection of Pericles, until he was banished (apparently for his religious opinions) about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. By this time, however, his work was done: his followers—Euripides and Thucydides, Archelaus and Diogenes of Apollonia—remained to carry on the Anaxagorean tradition and to stamp the age with rationalism.

Plato and Aristotle, as teleologists, complain that, while Anaxagoras assumed the existence of Mind, he made no effort to trace the working of this First Principle in the world of phenomena. The criticism was not entirely just, for Anaxagoras certainly laid the greatest stress on Mind as 'having power over all things which have life'; but, in any case, he will not be blamed at the present day for adopting a method which, as far as it went, was strictly in accordance with modern scientific principles. Starting from the assumption that animal and vegetable life are the same in kind though different in degree—

that plants are 'animals in earth' and feel pleasure and pain, Anaxagoras had to account for the superior intelligence of man, at the top of this ascending scale of all living things. Parmenides had prepared the way by holding that thought depended on the constitution of the limbs; and Anaxagoras emphasised the importance of specific structure, concluding that 'man is the most intelligent of animals because he has hands.'¹⁶ This famous pronouncement must have raised a storm of protest, for Socrates was now beginning to champion the cause of teleology, and not only made Man the centre of the Universe, but explained all existence—whether animate or inanimate—as subordinate to human interests. The sun shines to give man light, the moon and the stars mark the hours and seasons for his benefit; and to an objector who timidly remarked that the other animals also share in these advantages, Socrates had a ready reply that these animals have themselves been created for the service of man.¹⁷

With regard to human morphology, Socrates agreed with Anaxagoras that structure is a factor of importance—an animal with the form of an ox and the mind of a man could not do what is wanted; but those animals which have hands without reason (i.e. monkeys) are no better off. Reason requires form, but is not the result of form. In fact, as Aristotle afterwards interpreted the Socratic position, 'Anaxagoras ought to have said that man possesses hands because he is the wisest—Nature always gives an instrument to one fitted to use it.'

It is one of the ironies of history that Socrates, the teleologist, was confused, by his own contemporary Aristophanes, with Diogenes of Apollonia, who seems to have been a complete rationalist. Whatever justification the comic poet may have had for accusing Socrates of physical speculation, the philosopher in the *Clouds*, who swings aloft in a basket, to 'mingle his thought with fine air,' is a poor portrait of Socrates, but a very fair travesty of Diogenes. According to the latter, man's intellect is the outcome of his erect posture (*ὀρθότης*), which enabled him to breathe a purer air than the quadrupeds—a dangerous argument, as Theophrastus saw, remarking that mountaineers should be wiser than other men, and birds the wisest of all.¹⁸ Indeed, the argument of *ὀρθότης* was triumphantly appropriated by the teleologists themselves, and became a commonplace, as evidence of Design, from the time of Socrates to Galen. But whereas Socrates, with his utilitarian common sense, was content to assume that man's erect posture protects him from danger, post-Aristotelian philosophers—especially the Stoics—saw in it a proof that man was intended to look upwards and admire the heavens.

No school of thought—it should be added—had the least suspicion that this *ὀρθότης* might have been evolved. To the Epicurean, as to the Aristotelian, Nature's gift was original—there is no suggestion of the Darwinian view that intelligence increased as soon as man attained a bipedal existence, and could use his hands for purposes beyond mere locomotion.

As for the monkey, it had 'hands' of a sort, but plainly Nature did not give these hands because monkeys are wise. Aristotle therefore fell back on the usual Greek idea that the monkey is a parody of man—the simian hand is more brutal than the human, and the monkey is, after all, more of a quadruped than a biped.¹⁹

This list of Athenian rationalists in the fifth century is completed by Archelaus, who has recently been claimed as, in a measure, the forerunner of Darwin. His dependence on Anaxagoras is evident, though he was an eclectic who borrowed from Anaximander and other sources, and so can hardly be called an independent philosopher. But his position has an interest, as representing the effect of Anaxagoras in the age and country of Pericles. His eclecticism is apparent from the following passage, which is the chief testimony to his opinions :

'On Animals he says that, when the earth began to be warmed in the lower part, where the warm and the cold were mingling, many living creatures appeared, and men among them, all having the same way of life, being nourished by slime. They were short-lived ; but afterwards they generated from each other. Men were distinguished from the rest and set up leaders and laws and cities and other things. And he says that Mind is implanted in all living creatures alike ; for every animal uses Mind, some more slowly, others more quickly.'

In this there is no hint of any belief in the evolution of species ; man and other animals have started

fair in the race of life, but man, having a quicker Mind, outstripped the rest. Archelaus, indeed, is more retrograde than his master; for although he allowed the existence of Mind (which he identified with air, and called a 'god'), he seems to have denied that this god was the cause of the ordered universe.²⁰ Like Democritus, he regards Mind as merely an accidental attribute of man. With these premisses, we are prepared to learn that he followed, or even started, the Sophistic theory that morality is conventional.

From this account it seems evident that when, in the third century, Epicurus set himself the task of constructing a system of anthropology, he found all the material ready to hand in theories formulated in the age of Enlightenment at Athens. Except for hints borrowed from the Sicilian Empedocles, he need have looked no further than his own city, and the ancients themselves saw his obligation to Anaxagoras and Archelaus.²¹ As, however, his physical system was not based on the atomism of Anaxagoras, but on that of Democritus, there is a presumption that the home of his anthropology, too, was Abdera rather than Athens. This is the more probable since Democritus, although he may have owed much to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, was himself a great original thinker, whose influence on later Greek speculation was only second—if second at all—to that of Aristotle. Democritus started with the ordinary postulates—that life originated in slime, and that the differences between plants and animals

(including men) are of degree, not of kind ; but he certainly added much to the common stock of biological opinion. Thus, while Empedocles had only dealt with the adaptation of the complete organism, Democritus was interested in the functions of its parts. Following up his general theory that the Universe is governed by a law of motion, which he called Necessity, he applied this mechanistic interpretation to the animal organism.

The sense-organs are adapted to their functions, but this adaptation is due to Necessity, not Design. 'It does not rain in order to increase the corn, but by a law of necessity, which makes cold water descend ; the growth of the corn is an accident. So, in the human body, different types of teeth (for example) have different functions, but these functions are accidental.' These words are Aristotle's, and are usually supposed to represent his own rather grudging concession to a mechanical element in causation ; but the context allows, and the philosophy surely requires us to explain the passage as a summary of Democritean views and not as an opinion of the great teleologist.²²

How far Democritus anticipated the Epicureans in elaborating the history of culture is unknown ; but he must have disregarded the Golden Age as mythological, and his recorded opinions on primitive man assume a gradual progress. The earliest stages in human civilisation were imitated from the lower animals : the spider taught men weaving and needlework ; the swallow, housebuilding ; the swan and nightingale, singing. This idea of mimicry was not

altogether original, for the lyric poet Aleman had long before attributed human music to the imitation of birds. Democritus also held that music, not being a necessity, was one of the younger arts.²³ Human mimicry was therefore not confined to the first beginnings of civilisation. A theory which attaches so much weight to man's imitative faculties, and so little to his own powers of origination, may sound strange to a modern evolutionist, who assumes that the earliest men inherited instincts and capacities from sub-human ancestors. To Democritus this explanation was not open. He could not endow primitive man with inherited characters; but man possessed the innate faculty of reason, and therefore developed by imitation of animals, which preceded him in their appearance on the earth.

Although mimicry is of course quite inadequate to explain human progress, it certainly contains an element of truth. Many inventions, as Ratzel points out, must have been suggested to man by the observation of animals, 'as when we find the tail of a gnu or eland used by the Bushmen of South Africa, just as it was by its first owner, to keep off the flies.'²⁴ In default of evolutionary ideas, human mimicry was a reasonable substitute; and Democritus comes nearer to the truth than Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who exactly reversed the relation of man and the lower animals, holding that many animal habits or faculties are copies (*μιμήματα*) of man. In the ninth book of the *Historia Animalium*—a part of the work which seems to have been written by a

follower of Aristotle—the swallow's nest and the monogamy of pigeons are such μιμήματα.²⁵ We need not suppose that the Peripatetics thought the copy to be direct and conscious in every case—it is inspired by Nature, who always aims at the best, and so causes the lower animals to mimic her highest creation unconsciously—but they seem to have believed that animals learnt at least some lessons by direct contact with man, as well as with other species.

It is remarkable that the Democritean theory of imitation was not applied to human language as well as to human arts; the notion that rational speech has been evolved by mimicry of animal cries might well have occurred to Democritus as easily as to Darwin, who allowed for mimicry as one factor in the evolution of language: 'I cannot doubt that language owes its origin to the imitation and modification of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and man's own instinctive cries aided by signs and gestures.'²⁶ But Democritus apparently believed that the relation of animal voices and human speech was not closely analogous to the singing of birds and men, and he had therefore to cast about for some other explanation. Since the time of Heraclitus (or even Pythagoras) the origin of language had been a vexed question between the champions of 'Nature' and 'Convention,' and Democritus followed the latter school. In order to understand his position, it will be necessary to indicate, as briefly as possible, the general lines on which the

problem of language was debated, as far as can be gathered from a very imperfect record of evidence.²⁷

Heraclitus seems to have believed that the nature of Being could be explained by Names, on the supposition that language is 'natural' (*φύσει*), i.e. that every name expresses the character and qualities of the object. Sometimes, he thought, the word bears its meaning on its face, as when the equation $\xi\nu\nu\acute{o}\nu = \xi\nu\nu \nu\acute{o}\omega$ proves that reason is common to all, or when the genitive *Ζηνός* shows that Zeus is the living God. Sometimes, on the principle of *lucus a non lucendo*, he used etymology to support his doctrine that opposites are the same: thus, the name of the bow (*βίος*) is life (*βίος*), but its function is death. At the present day we have so far outgrown this conception of a 'natural' language that its bare survival has become a comic theme—we are reminded of the cricketer in *Punch* who, when asked the meaning of 'Yorker,' replied 'I don't know what else you could call it.' But the conception is intelligible and even inevitable, at any early stage of thought, when the name was held to have a real and intimate connection with the name-bearer. A savage often regards his name as a part of his own life or personality, and shrinks from divulging it to a stranger. The writing of a name on a tablet, or even its pronouncement, is as effective in a magical curse as the possession of the hair or nails or clothes of the person to be cursed. Among the Greeks the name of a person was invested with a significance which we can now only realise by an

effort of imagination ; it is ominous, for good or evil ; and if a man belies his name he proves false to his nature. For the vitality of the idea, it may be enough to mention a very recent heresy-hunt on Mount Athos, directed against a large number of monks who have suffered persecution on the sole ground that they believe the Name of Jesus, being part of God, to be itself divine.

At first sight there is an argument which might well have given Heraclitus pause—the existence of other languages. If ἄρτος is the ‘natural’ word for ‘bread,’ why did the Phrygians call it *Βεκός* ? The objection could be met in more ways than one. In the popular mind, Greek was the only language ; barbarian tongues were but the twittering of swallows, unworthy of serious consideration. Whether the Heraclitans were satisfied with this simple solution, is uncertain ; Plato, at least, is more liberal, and places Greek and barbarian ‘legislators,’ who gave things their names, on a complete equality.²³ A correspondence of words and things can be achieved in any language : ‘every smith does not use the same iron, though he makes the same instrument for the same purpose.’ Plato’s own position, in the *Cratylus*, has been the subject of much controversy, which cannot here be discussed ; he certainly allowed for convention ; but, in the main, he was a supporter of natural origin, and tried to arrive at the meaning of words by the onomatopoetic principle of analysing the letters of the alphabet.

But the ‘natural’ theory did not escape criticism

in the Sophistic age, when the first attempt to study grammar probably suggested the view that language is conventional (*θέσει*). This position is represented in the *Cratylus* by Hermogenes, who maintains that names were given by mutual agreement (*ξυνθήκη καὶ ὁμολογία*) and points out that, like the names of slaves, they can be given or changed at will—an argument that must have had some weight with Plato himself, who had once borne the name of Aristocles.

In supporting the theory of Convention, Democritus laid stress on the capriciousness of language: a word might have several meanings, and, conversely, one meaning might be expressed by several words; again, *φρόνησις* has a cognate verb, *φρονεῖν*, whereas *δικαιοσύνη* has no such cognate. Of course this criticism on the inadequacy of language does not really tell in favour of Democritus, but points to the natural evolution of speech from rude beginnings, which lack the logical consistency of an Esperanto. Democritus, however, seems to have argued that if language is 'natural'—in the Heraclitan sense—a thing *can* have only one name, and *must* have one; inconsistencies, whether of excess or defect, are fatal to the theory. It may be added that a philosopher, who held nothing to be real except atoms and void, all other things having only a conventional existence, could hardly have believed in a natural origin of language.

Both the natural and conventional theories rested on the assumption that language was 'taught'

by an *ὀνομοθέτης* (whether human or divine), just as morality was ascribed to a *νομοθέτης*; and herein lay the flaw which Epicurus seems to have detected. How came a single man—asks Lucretius—to have the exclusive knowledge of speech? And, if he had, how could he compel the rest to learn the names of things? Apparently the belief in a primitive 'name-giver' survived this attack, for, in the second century after Christ we find the Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda returning to the charge: it is perfectly absurd to suppose that Hermes or even a human philosopher could have summoned men together and instructed them like a schoolmaster.²⁹

Dissatisfied with the attempt of Democritus, Epicurus approached the whole problem afresh, and gave a new value to both the terms *φύσις* and *θείσις*. He rightly saw that language is rooted in a natural and spontaneous instinct, just as it was Nature, and no divine or human lawgiver, that instructed men in the arts of civilisation. Other animals—Lucretius instances horses, dogs, and birds—utter different sounds to express their various emotions; a child uses gestures before it has learnt to speak. In this deeper sense language is *φύσει*—an interpretation which includes the old meaning of Nature, since the first words are the natural expression of primary emotions (*πάθη*). So also the name of each material object is natural; for sense-perception, according to Epicurus, is due to images (*φαντάσματα*) which are thrown off the surface of the object and transmitted to the mind by the medium of the senses.

Hence the existence of many languages : in different parts of the world men experience different *πάθη* and perceive different *φαντάσματα*—and so Epicurus falls into line with all the other Greeks who explain anthropology in terms of geography.

So far, however, Epicurus was only dealing with the embryonic stage of language ; he had still to account for a developed speech. Here *θέσις* plays a part ; but it is not the arbitrary convention of a name-giver imposing a fixed nomenclature : like law and justice, language is the product of the social contract—the hypothetical institution by which Epicurean anthropology may be said to stand, and (in a sense) to fall. For, although no definite contract is mentioned for language-making, as for law-making, it is evident that Epicurus has the same sort of mutual agreement in mind : ‘ afterwards ’ (i.e. after the first period of nature-speech) particular words were made common in the several nations, in order that their meaning might be less ambiguous and more briefly conveyed.³⁰ Finally Epicurus allows for the initiative of individuals, who introduced words for ‘ things unseen,’ i.e. for objects or concepts, from which no images were transmitted to other men. He recognises, in fact, that single persons as well as numbers have their share in the formation of a developed language.

It is this combination of Nature and Convention that marks out the Epicurean theory as so immensely superior to the first tentative excursions of Heraclitus. On the biological side, it needs to be supplemented

by Darwin; for, as Giusanni remarks, although Epicurus realises the internal growth of a species, he has no conception of the evolution of one species from another. 'Mute' beasts, he thinks, have the inchoate power of speech; but the human powers are not inherited from them. The speaking organs of man are not developed by practice; they are pre-existent, and ready for use. But, in reconstructing the genesis of speech, Epicurus not only outran Heraclitus, but all other Greek philosophers, and—at least with regard to the rudimentary stages of language—is far more in harmony with modern thought.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF RACE

It has been observed that the Greeks had a natural tendency to dichotomise—to 'think in pairs,' and to view each object by contrast with its antithesis. Hence, at any early stage—although, as Thucydides noted, this stage was not Homeric—the Hellenes distinguished themselves from the other peoples whom they called collectively and indiscriminately 'barbarians.' They did not claim to be a Chosen Race, in the Hebrew sense; but they were none the less conscious of being a peculiar people, differentiated from all others by superior characteristics.

Possibly we are apt to attach excessive importance to the contrast between "Ελληνες and βάρβαροι owing to the secondary and regular meaning of the modern word 'barbarian'; but a general term, which included the wildest savage as well as the most civilised Asiatic, was bound to have an invidious connotation to the Greeks themselves. And there is no doubt that Greek exclusiveness was a marked feature in every period of the national history; until the barriers

were finally broken by Roman conquerors, who were quite free from racial intolerance. Politically, of course, the Greeks could then no longer afford to be more exclusive than their masters; but they could still console their wounded pride by insisting on the intellectual and artistic superiority of their own race, and the Romans were always ready to abet this claim. As a result, the old antithesis between Greek and barbarian was not destroyed, but readjusted to the new conditions, and the glory of having 'introduced the arts to rustic Latium' remained as a compensation for the loss of political prestige.

It is hardly needful to quote examples of this mental attitude. Any Greek would have thanked God that he was born a Greek, not a barbarian, and we are not surprised to find this rather Pharisaic thanksgiving attributed to various distinguished philosophers. Sometimes the feeling against barbarians is definitely national, and aggravated by growing danger from external enemies. Aeschylus, at least, is generous enough to a beaten foe—the Persian defeat is due to the overweening pride of Xerxes rather than to the degeneracy of his people—but, in the later phases of the long struggle, the tone becomes more bitter: Isocrates alternates between hatred and contempt of the Persians, 'natural enemies' of Greece, and Demosthenes reviles the Macedonians—(who were scarcely outside the Hellenic pale)—as barbarians, and 'not even decent barbarians.' The line in the *Telephus* of Euripides—

‘Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάρους δουλεύομεν;’

whether we call it arrogance or proper pride, is characteristic of all Greek political thought.

Apart from politics, there was a powerful motive for despising, or affecting to despise, the barbarian: the vast majority of slaves in Greece were foreigners—Phrygians, Syrians, and the like—and, when enlightened opinion began to doubt the ‘justice’ of slavery, a belief that the institution was ‘natural’ must have been a salve to the conscience of the respectable slave-owner. From Euripides to the latest Cynics and Stoics, there were many who doubted or denied the right of one man to enslave another. But the average Greek must always have agreed with Aristotle that the Greeks were naturally free, the barbarians servile.¹ The great philosopher has been blamed for lagging behind the more advanced opinion of his own day; and it must be confessed that his ostensible defence of slavery is weak enough. He emphasises the difference between τὸ ἄρχον and τὸ ἀρχόμενον—the states of ruling and being ruled—and remarks that a man rules over wife, child, and slave in different degrees; but he fails to prove that all these degrees are equally natural—the fallacy slips in with the ambiguous term ‘ruling.’ But although Aristotle does not make the best of a bad case, he need not be accused of simply reflecting common opinion, fond as he is of deferring to accepted views. His own anthropological system really encouraged, if it did not demand, a belief in the natural slave. All nature is continuous, with imperceptible steps rising from the inanimate to the plant, from

the plant to the lowest animal, and from this again to man. But between even the most intelligent animal and the Hellene there was an obvious gap, an apparent break in the continuity. This gulf could only be bridged by the assumption of human varieties whose intellectual equipment was but slightly higher than mere animal intelligence. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of the free and the slaves ; failing this, she has formed a bridge in the human mind, so that the slave has no deliberative faculty, and differs only from the animals in the power of listening to reason.

A further point must be noticed : Aristotle had not only to describe his nicely-graduated scale ; he had also to explain its significance, to co-ordinate its parts, and to show their interdependence. The relation of organisms is not temporal, and so it must be teleological. Aristotle was not acquainted with biological analogies for human slavery—such as the ‘ slaves ’ of ants—but he was content with the broad principle that Nature means the lower to serve the higher : plants exist for the sake of animals ; both plants and animals for the sake of man.² But, if man himself is unequal, what could be more ‘ natural ’ than that the lower man should exist for the higher—especially as the advantage is mutual—or, in plain Greek, that the barbarian should be a slave of the Hellene ?

But there was another side of the question. If Aristotle found it necessary to stigmatise the barbarians as a whole class, he was (at least among educated

thinkers) the exception rather than the rule. His advice to Alexander—to treat the Greeks as a leader and the barbarians as a master—was condemned by the broad-minded Eratosthenes, who said that men should only be distinguished by their moral qualities, without regard to race.³ And, long before Aristotle, at a time when the Greeks had far more reason for racial pride, we find an astonishing fairness in their outlook on foreign nations. No writer is more free from prejudice than the first Greek historian, whose aim, as he avows in his opening sentence, is to preserve from oblivion the great and wonderful deeds of the Greeks and barbarians. It is interesting to notice how Lucian perverted this plain statement by paraphrasing it as ‘Greek victories and barbarian defeats.’ But Lucian wrote in days when decadent Greece was forced to draw freely on the capital of past glory, just as the impartiality of Herodotus surprised and annoyed Plutarch, who calls him *φιλοβάρβαρος*, and even grudges his tribute to the Persian bravery at Plataea.⁴ Herodotus was not alone in admiring the quality of the Persians, who taught their sons to ride and shoot and speak the truth. In the next generation, Xenophon took Cyrus as his ideal monarch and eulogised the system which had made Persia an imperial power, while he does not forget to point out that the Persians of his own day had declined from their former excellence. Ancient Persia, it is plain, was ‘romantic’ to an Athenian—for Xenophon, in spite of his Spartan tendencies, is a typical Athenian—and the choice of Cyrus as the hero of romance is

a deserved compliment to a race whose virtues Xenophon had learned to appreciate in his short service with the younger namesake of the great King. Antisthenes was not less flattering to foreign virtue in his comparison of Heracles and Cyrus as equal patterns of the strenuous life, although the value of this testimony may be weakened by the cosmopolitan views of the Cynic school.⁵ But this Cynic attitude is, of course, in itself a proof that the stronghold of Hellenic pride was never impregnable.

Towards Egypt, again, the earlier Greek feeling was almost entirely respectful. Greece owed a real debt to the ancient Egyptian civilisation, and the debt, so far from being discounted, was often exaggerated, so that Greek religion, philosophy, law and culture were all attributed to the wisdom of the Egyptians. The fascination of Egypt is apparent in Herodotus. But that impartial traveller did not confine his attention to the great centres of ancient civilisation. In the course of his wanderings Herodotus had gained that 'enlightening of man's judgment from the commerce of men' which Montaigne attributes to 'frequenting abroad in the world.' He came into contact with almost every stage of social development, but he records the most savage practice without the slightest tone of superiority. Once or twice he indulges in approval or censure, as in remarking that the marriage-market is the best Babylonian custom, but the prostitution in the temple of Mylitta is 'most disgraceful.'⁶ No doubt his usual tolerance may be partly due to the

fact that his interest overpowers his moral judgment ; as has been said, ' Herodotus is full of intellectual curiosity, but temporarily indifferent to the moral aspects of the story. In that he is a true devotee of *θεωρία*.' ⁷ But this is as much as to say that Herodotus is a true anthropologist—his business is not to moralise, but to observe. Nor is he really careless : his whole outlook shows a deep reverence for custom, which, even if distasteful or horrible, is not lightly to be altered. Only a madman, he thinks, would laugh at the habits of another race. This is not indifference, but respect for the law which—however mysterious in its working—is the unwritten ordinance of the gods. Custom is custom—*ἀμφὶ τῷ νόμῳ τούτῳ ἐχέτω ὡς καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐνομίσθη*. So Pausanias, remembering his model Herodotus, passes even the savage practice of human sacrifice—lingering, or believed to linger, in the remote parts of Greece itself as late as the second century of our own era—with the remark 'let it be as it is, and as it was at the beginning.' ⁸

It was in this liberal spirit that Herodotus approached the problem of Race. He found human beings traditionally divided into a number of *ἔθνεα* or 'races,' and although he did not consider the *ἔθνος* to be an ultimate or original division of man, he accepted it as the practical unit of classification. Thus, the Greeks themselves were marked off from all other stocks by certain specific differences—the ties of blood, language, religion and culture.⁹ Of course this famous definition of Hellenism is not

strictly concerned with the criteria of race: it will be noticed that Herodotus *assumes* kinship between Spartans and Athenians (*ὁμαίμων*); common language, religion and culture are not adduced as evidence of consanguinity, but as facts observable among those whose blood-relationship is otherwise established. At most, such tests offered a good reason why kinsfolk should be friendly; and, failing other evidence, may themselves help to prove community of blood. As we shall see, the predominant Greek criterion of race was tradition; but, before examining the reason for this predominance, we may briefly review the attitude of Herodotus towards other criteria.

With regard to language, Herodotus was at least wiser than our own immediate ancestors; he knew that a nation could acquire a language by contact, and so he never fell into the trap of the linguistic fallacy which caught the modern 'Aryan' philologists. The Aethiopians in Asia and Africa belong to the same race, but they differ in language and hair. At the same time, Herodotus allows philology a reasonable place as an ethnic test, and he admits that the oldest language—if its priority could be proved—would imply the oldest race—a conclusion with which no one presumably would disagree.¹⁰ Similarly, he knew that religions travel. His chief instance of this principle—the derivation of Greek gods from Egypt—was mistaken; but he correctly noted that Greek religion was a compound to which 'Pelasgians,' i.e. the old Mediterranean stock, had contributed their share. In his scale of values, however, a community

of cults is superior to the linguistic test: there was a temple of Carian Zeus to which Mysians and Lydians had access by right of blood, and those nations which belonged to a different race, even if they had come to speak the Carian language, were excluded.¹¹

Again, to Herodotus the evidence of culture (*ῥθεια*) is important, but, like that of religion, is not in itself a conclusive test of consanguinity. Certain customs may be evolved—or, as Herodotus would have said, may be ‘invented’ independently. For example, he is struck by the likeness between the Egyptian military caste, who may practise no handicraft, and the warrior-class in Sparta and indeed in all Greek states except Corinth. Here a theory of transmission would have been easy, for the Spartan Kings were believed to have had Egyptian as well as Assyrian ancestors, and Herodotus notes various customs which the Spartans shared with Egypt or Assyria. But he wisely refrains from pushing the hypothesis of borrowing too far, ‘since the Thracians, Scythians, Persians, Lydians, and almost all barbarians despise craftsmen in comparison with other citizens and especially with soldiers.’ In many cases, however, he believes that culture has been transmitted, and is therefore no evidence in ethnology: Athenian women have borrowed first the Dorian and then the Carian dress; the Persian civilisation is indebted to Media and Egypt, while one at least of the Persian vices is derived from Greece.¹² But, on the whole, the evidence of culture or ritual is admitted as a sound criterion of consanguinity: a difference of

ritual observed by Carian inhabitants of Egypt is a proof that they are not Egyptian ; and the Colchian practice of circumcision—though Phoenicians and Syrians acknowledged that it was not native to themselves—seems to Herodotus a convincing proof that the Colchians belong to the Egyptian stock.¹³ In the latter instance he adds other arguments—a common method of weaving flax and a general similarity in the life and language of the two nations—but these, he thinks, are inconclusive when compared with the striking custom of circumcision ; and, in particular, he depreciates the value of physique, which ‘ comes to nothing, for there are others who have dark skin and curly hair.’

Herodotus may well be pardoned for showing some vacillation in his estimate of culture as a trustworthy criterion of race ; the problem is extremely complicated, and could not possibly be solved with the methods and material at his command ; and indeed the two theories of independent evolution or transmission divide modern anthropologists into opposite camps. Hitherto the British school have mainly proceeded on evolutionary ideas, holding that similarities of culture in different regions are due to the essential similarity of the human mind, which, in the same conditions, may be expected to produce the same results. On the other hand, an important school is now beginning to attach far less weight to evolution, and explains many resemblances, formerly accepted as independent in origin, by the assumption of contact.¹⁴

A modern ethnologist, however, will not so readily excuse the Greeks for their serious neglect of physique, which we have learnt to recognise as the ultimate criterion. The chief cause of this neglect was the belief that physical and mental character is entirely due to environment—it is a geographical accident rather than evidence of race.¹⁵ According to Hippocrates, the younger contemporary of Herodotus, ‘you will generally find that human physique and character follow the nature of the country.’ In particular, the broad distinction between fair and dark races was explained as due to the immediate action of the sun. Aeschylus had already laid stress on the principle: Prometheus, parched by the sun, will change his colour; the Danaids, though originally of Argive descent, have become like Libyans or Egyptians or Indians, from the heat of their adopted country; the black Ethiopians dwell by the fountains of the sun. Even in their own climate the Greeks noted the difference between the sunburnt men and the ‘fairer sex,’ whose life was so largely spent indoors, and the insurgent women of the *Ecclesiazusae*, in their masculine disguise, pass easily for cobblers, the only ‘white men’ for whom Athens had any use.¹⁶ The distinction of colour between the sexes was indicated in certain types of Greek vases. So, in later times, the curly hair and pigmentation of the black races was sufficiently explained by the ‘neighbouring’ sun, and the further differences between Indian and African types could be attributed to the special influence of local rivers or the atmosphere,¹⁷

for Water and Air, with the Sun, formed a triad whose action determined physical and moral characters.

In a spirit half mythological, half scientific, Aeschylus pays his tribute to the river as *κουροτρόφος*, nurturer of the young. To him, as to Herodotus and many others, Egypt is in a very real sense the gift of the Nile, which has fixed the type of those who dwell on its banks; and, when Aeschylus explains the difference between Argives and Egyptians by the remark 'Nile breeds a race unlike the Inachus,' the poet is anticipating the physician Hippocrates, in a work whose very title—*περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων*—shows the influence of air and water in ancient medicine.

With regard to the third member of the triad, we have already seen the importance of the Air in philosophy, before Hippocrates made it a matter of medical study; and, from the fifth century onwards, it was regarded as the chief, if not the only clue to the variations of human character. Athenians, 'walking delicately through most pellucid air,' gave their climate the credit for their intelligence. Plato was not so easily satisfied; although far from underrating the value of the atmosphere, he knew that a land cannot live on Air alone—it should have deep soil and good water. Accepting and amplifying the myths of Athenian greatness in former days, he expected to find a corresponding superiority in Attica over all other lands; for Hephaestus and Athena had chosen it as suited to the virtue and intelligence of the people whom they proposed to

plant therein.¹⁸ But here a difficulty arose: the Attica of Plato's day was a 'poor' country, with more than its due share of barren mountain and stony scrub-land which, like the Corsican *maquis*, can give little sustenance for man or for his domestic animals, except the goat.¹⁹ Thucydides, in his dry way, had suggested that the claim of the Athenians to be autochthonous might be justified διὰ τὸ λεπτόγειον—the thin soil was no temptation to an invader. The inhabitants of Athens were Cranai, 'rock-men'; and, although the title was no doubt confined originally to the primitive settlement on the Acropolis, the ancients thought it appropriate to the whole of Attica. Plato was therefore forced to assume a cataclysmal change in the geological conditions after the mythical age of Athens. Since that prehistoric period—9000 years before Solon—only the 'bones of Attica' had been left, constant deluges having gradually washed away the fertile soil, and denuded the mountains of their finest trees. Attica was no longer the home of 'true farmers with the best land and the most abundant water, as well as the most temperate climate'; and Athenian character had correspondingly degenerated since the old heroic days.²⁰

The geographical theory of race reaches its height in Polybius: 'we mortals,' says that historian, 'have an irresistible tendency to yield to climatic influence: and to this cause, and no other, may be traced the great distinctions which prevail amongst us in character, physical formation, and complexion, as well as most

of our habits, varying with nationality or wide local separation.' In the introduction to the *Characters* of Theophrastus, the writer expresses surprise that Greek should differ so much from Greek, when all are beneath the same sky and share the same education; and his wonder—although Jebb calls it 'fatuous'—is really quite reasonable on the geographical hypothesis. Strabo seems to stand apart in doubting the effect of environment as the sole cause of variation. The geographer does ample justice to the received theory, emphasising, for example, the natural advantages of Italy, which helped to make Rome mistress of the world; but at the same time he refuses to work a single hypothesis to death. Climate would not account for everything. It would not explain the oratorical talent of the Athenians, which is lacking in their near neighbours the Spartans and Boeotians. The Greeks, in their days of greatness, were not helped, but hindered, by mountains, and the Romans have civilised many tribes in the most unfavourable regions. There is the further objection that, as he notes, the same stage of society—e.g. the Nomadic—is found in different kinds of country.²¹

Habit and training, he concludes, must be taken into account, although he does not explain *why* some nations have acquired better 'habits' than others. A modern upholder of the geographical school might argue that these habits do ultimately, though not immediately, depend on the environment—i.e. that Athenian and Spartan characters were differentiated in remote ages when their respective ancestors lived

further apart, and under natural conditions more diverse than those of Greece. To Strabo, who believed that both Athenians and Spartans were indigenous, this explanation was not open. But the Greeks in general had an almost pathetic confidence in the efficacy of Law—they had no doubt that a nation could be made sober by Act of Parliament—and Strabo was presumably satisfied with the power of the ‘law-giver’ or the philosopher to counteract the effects of environment. Even Hippocrates, with his whole-hearted belief in the influence of climate, had attached some weight to government as a factor in moulding national character—Europeans are more warlike than Asiatics, not only because of their climate and country, but because they are not ruled by a despot; and Plato, convinced as he was that ‘on winds and temperature and water will depend the virtue or vice of a city’s inhabitants,’ was as firmly convinced that the final impress of character was stamped by education.²² Man needs both education and a fortunate nature, if he is not to be the most savage of earthly beings; for breeding and training act and react; ‘good nurture and education implant good natures, and these good natures, in their turn, being rooted in good education, improve, and this specially effects the breed in man as in other animals.’²³ Like all the Greeks, Plato had no doubt about the transmission of acquired characters.

By insisting on the paramount importance of training and education, the later Greeks escaped the fatalism of geographic environment—they realised

to some extent that, whatever may be the effect of climate and environment on a race in a non-civilised stage, this effect is largely counteracted by civilisation. Race—however it is to be explained—is too rigid to be a mere reflex of locality. It is true that recent investigation rather tends to rehabilitate the Greek geographical theory, as far as physical types are concerned. An American Commission has shown that a change of environment may produce an immediate effect upon immigrants, races with long and short heads conforming equally to the more uniform type of their adopted country. On the other hand, the persistence of broad racial characters—both physical and moral—under new conditions is a matter of common observation. Both backward and forward races have existed in all quarters of the earth; in Greece itself the Franks and Turks preserved their own physical character, and their own systems of social and political life, with but little conformity to the Hellenic model. A race—like the British—which has already acquired civilisation can migrate to an entirely different climate and retain its institutions with the least possible adaptation to the new environment. Strabo, in particular, stood far in advance of the modern Hippocrateans, who tried to unlock all ethnological doors with the single key of geography—of all, in fact, from Montesquieu to Buckle, who believed that the different aspects of nature were immediately reflected in the institutions or characters of different races.

To return to Herodotus. As we have just seen,

the evidence of language, religion, and culture was important, but not final, while physique was of less value as an ethnical test. What really counted was tradition, even in face of difficulties presented by other criteria. The Sigynnae, a Danubian tribe, claimed to be Medes in origin. Geographically the two peoples were far apart, and Herodotus cannot suggest any proof of the claim, beyond some similarity in dress. But he knew of constant migrations among Greeks and barbarians in the ages preceding his own; and, just as it seemed possible for Aethiopians to be found in Asia and Africa, so Medes might well have migrated to the Danube. Anything, he says, may happen in course of time. So he accepts the bare tradition of the Sigynnae for the same reason that he is satisfied with the authority of Homer for the Aethiopians. As Prof. Myres observes, 'the Greeks themselves held family tradition to be good evidence of common descent; and as a matter of fact the professional genealogist has been beforehand with the anthropologist at nearly all points with the Greek-speaking world.'²⁴

In dealing with the Hellenic race, the tests of language, religion, and culture were all favourable; but the final proof was the genealogy of Hellen—an article of faith as unquestioned by Thucydides as by Herodotus. Neither historian grasped the fact that Hellen had been invented to explain the Hellenes.

There was, however, a complication which disturbed the theory of a pure Hellenic stock. Herodotus

knew of the 'Pelasgi,' pre-historic inhabitants of Greece, who had not been exterminated or expelled by Greek conquerors. On the contrary, the Arcadians claimed Pelasgian ancestry, and the Athenians were proud of the same descent; indeed, to the Dorian Herodotus only Dorians were originally Hellenic. Aeschylus had reckoned the Pelasgians as old Hellenes, without opening the question how or when the Hellenic race had come into being—the matter did not concern a poet. But the historian felt called upon to account for the relation of the two stocks; and, being obviously puzzled, he took refuge in the vague expression 'the Attic race, which was Pelasgian, learnt the [Greek] language when it changed to the Greeks.'²⁵ The metamorphosis was gradual, for the Attic Pelasgians had undergone several changes before they became Ionians under the leadership of Ion, grandson of Hellen; and thus contact with the eponymous hero is the last step in Hellenisation.

Clearly, then, Herodotus did not regard the Greek race, as a pure stock, fixed from the beginning. His own city Halicarnassus, though a Dorian settlement, contained a large admixture of native Carians; yet the city was 'Greek.' Thucydides is more precise. In his account of Greek origins, Phthiotis appears as the home of the Hellenes, whose name gradually spread, as Pelasgians and other peoples came into contact with the race. Actual consanguinity therefore mattered but little, although no doubt Thucydides believed that long fusion of the original elements justified the later claim of common blood. But he

definitely regards Hellenism as a bond of culture established by association, rather than as a racial term. A few years later, Isocrates, the sworn foe of barbarians and the champion of Greek unity, pays little heed to the hall-mark of race: 'our city,' he says, 'has caused the name of Greeks to appear no longer a sign of blood but of mind (*διανοίας*); it is those who share our culture who are called Greeks rather than those who share our blood.'²⁶

Plato, too, has visions of a wider horizon, transcending Greek limitations. He is not without political prejudice; for, although he rejects the dichotomy of Greek and barbarian as unscientific—the only ultimate distinction is between male and female—he is none the less emphatic in his practical distinction. The Greek race is one family, separate from all other stocks, and if Athenians are superior to the rest, it is because they are not contaminated by barbarian blood—a commonplace of Attic panegyrists.²⁷ His objection to slavery goes no further than a protest against Greek enslaving Greek. But there is no room for this prejudice in the dream of his final city, whose pattern is laid up, not in Greece, but heaven. The ideal is for all mankind; 'until philosophers are kings, or kings philosophers, neither the Greek cities *nor the human race* will be free from evil.' Of course, before this consummation can be attained, the world must come into the Hellenic fold. But the fold was open to receive the flock; Hellenism was independent of a single race, a gift to the world.

The Greek had no small pride of birth—we

remember the jibes of Aristophanes about barbarians who wriggle into Athenian citizenship—but birth is chiefly valuable as the passport for entrance to the Greek city, with all its advantages of law and order, beauty and culture. Such an attitude had its drawbacks. It ministered to the Greek self-complacency. In Euripides, Jason suggests as an excuse for his faithlessness that he has really done Medea a service by bringing her from a barbarian land to Greece, where she can learn the meaning of justice. With this astonishing argument Euripides (though his own portrait of Medea is a sympathetic study of a foreigner) voices the patronising contempt of Greek for barbarian, which reaches its acme when a slave in comedy is supposed to feel an obligation to his master, ‘through whom he learnt Greek laws, was taught letters and was initiated into the mysteries.’ Freedom, we gather, is less important than philosophy, and we learn—even from Epicurus—that only Greeks can philosophise.²⁸

On the other hand, the ancients were apparently quite free from the antipathy of the colour-bar, for reasons political, social, and anthropological. Politically, the later Greeks and the Romans—although they came into contact with various coloured peoples—were never called upon to exercise authority over large masses of dark-skinned races in India or Africa. From a social point of view, men were not classed as white or black, but as free or servile. Black slaves became fashionable (like black pages in England) after Alexander’s conquests, and the purchase of an Ethiopian

was a mark of 'petty ambition;' ²⁹ but the great majority of slaves were of the same colour as their Greek or Roman masters. There was no occasion for the modern antipathy, whether this has arisen from the fact that slavery has been mainly confined to coloured races, or from the feelings of mistrust and dislike with which the emancipated slave has been regarded in America and elsewhere, or from the conditions of modern imperialism.³⁰

Finally, as we have seen, the anthropology of the Greeks discountenanced any special stigma of colour, by regarding it as a mere geographical accident. The Greek was a monogenist: racial types of course exist, but they are not ultimate. To Aristotle man is a single species or *εἶδος*. He saw nothing abnormal in the Pygmies, 'who are really a small race, with small horses to match,' because such differences of physique, like other variations, could be explained by environment. Strabo, it is true, with his Stoic incredulity, thought the Pygmies to be a fable, and his scepticism was at least praiseworthy—'no credible witness has ever seen them.'³¹ But here the Greeks in general agreed with Aristotle, and time has proved him to be right.

CHAPTER V

THE CITY-STATE

ALL Greek philosophers preached a "life according to Nature," and the striking difference of their theories is at least a tribute to the flexibility of the formula. The conception of a natural life will vary, according as Nature is defined in a physical or biological sense—as a personification of laws governing the whole universe, or animal existence. If the definition is biological, further ambiguities may arise: it may be doubted whether human nature is to be regarded as special, or as shared—to a greater or less extent—by other animals.

From the physical point of view, the Greeks in general had little divergence of opinion as to Man's relation to the Universe. Nature was in harmony with Man. Human justice had its counterpart in universal order: *ισότης* and *δικαιοσύνη* ruled the physical world no less than the world of men. Of course the mere identity of terms may mean little or nothing—natural and human 'laws' are very different in modern connotation—but, as a fact, the Greek phraseology is here a true index of thought.

Greek humanism—nowhere more prominent than in Aristotle—invariably assumes that the processes of Nature are intelligible to man, and explicable in human terms. Ancient religion, no less than ancient philosophy, is rooted in this conception of universal harmony ; for, even if there is some truth in the old belief—

‘primus in orbe deos fecit timor,’

the historic Greeks had long passed the stage at which a dread of physical powers in Heaven or Earth is predominant. Nature was rarely malign ; and if she was apathetic, her sympathy could be enlisted by the magic of prayer. We need only recall the invocation of Nature in the *Prometheus* :

O Sky divine, O Winds of pinions swift,
O fountain-heads of Rivers, and O thou
Illimitable laughter of the Sea !
O Earth, the mighty Mother, and thou Sun,
Whose orbèd light surveyeth all—attest
What ills I suffer from the gods, a god !¹

This is good poetry, in any age ; but at the time of Aeschylus it was also good theology. Later, of course, the way was open for Epicurus to deny the teleological interpretation of the Universe, and thereby to cut the sympathetic bond between Earth and Man, by holding (against the Stoics) that the human and the universal natures were not only distinct but opposed : although Man must live in conformity with his own specific nature, and must adapt himself to his environment, the Universe does not exist for

his advantage. Only a small part of the earth is fit for human habitation; for the rest, zones of tropical heat and polar ice, barren mountain-ranges and arid deserts, vast swamps and impenetrable jungle—all the disharmonies of Nature refute the Stoic doctrine that Providence meant Man to inherit the earth. Less fortunate than the lower animals, Man finds at most the good and the evil in the world so evenly balanced that he may well doubt whether Nature is to be reckoned a kindly parent or a cruel step-mother.² But the old Greek mode of thought—the unity of existence—was too strong, even for Epicurus. He could realise man's struggle for life—a struggle with his physical environment no less than with beasts or fellow-men—but he had little conception of a Nature 'red in tooth and claw,' or of Man as 'Nature's insurgent son.' Man must come to terms with Nature; but she has herself pointed the path to reconciliation, by teaching him the benefits of Progress, rightly understood. A mere imitation of animals is not progressive but retrograde; and here Epicurus parted company with the Cynics who—starting from the Socratic idea of imitating God, by 'needing as little as possible'—found that animals needed less than Man, and so were nearer God. Epicurus would have agreed with Lucian's criticism that, if animals had been endowed with reason, they would have founded cities.³ He taught, indeed, in a garden, but the garden was at Athens. His protest was not against the place but the government. And he had more reason for protesting than the malcontents

who preceded him; in the fifth century Athens had been imperial, in the fourth she was at least free; but the Athens of his own time was either ruled by a tyrant, or at least overawed by a Macedonian garrison at her gate.

At the present day we may easily forget that the Greek desire to return to Nature was always very largely a political revolt. The huge modern city, with its noise and smoke, its crowded houses and dangerous traffic, had no close parallel in ancient Greece, although the Rome of Horace—and still more of Juvenal—was subject to many of the same discomforts. Athens was a pleasant place to live in; a Socrates could spend his life within its walls with but rare suburban walks along the banks of the Illyssus. A love of the country was a real feature of Greek sentiment; but the country was not far, and could be enjoyed by a citizen. Theocritus found pleasure in an orchard, but he started his day's excursion from the town.⁴ Greek literature has much to say in praise of pastoral or, still more often, of agricultural life, which, if hard, was 'simpler' and nearer God; but the *πόλις* is always in the background. Euripides may strike a note of dissatisfaction with city-life: 'it is the farmer alone that preserves his country—one of a class more remarkable for bravery than beauty, who seldom sets foot in the town or market-place, but works on his own land, the type of an innocent and blameless life.'⁵ But the farmer of Euripides, like the Ischomachus of Xenophon, is, after all, a citizen, who can play his part, if need be,

in the counsels of the state, and—still more important—‘can save his country’ on the battlefield.

The evolution of the city-state was actually the highest political and social achievement of the Greeks; and—with the exception of a small minority—they had no doubt that civilisation (*βίος ἡμερος*) was synonymous with city-life.⁶ How had this wonderful thing happened? From the end of the fifth century Greek political theorists were fond of putting and answering the question; and, as the process of evolution was still going on before their eyes, they were no bad judges. Thucydides pictures the earliest Greeks as living in separate hordes, who ‘cultivated the land just enough to subsist therefrom, without planting it with trees.’⁷ He had no idea of an invasion from the distant North, and did not search for *origines* beyond the borders of Thessaly; but, if modern speculation has thrown some light on the ancestors of the Greeks, his account of primitive Greece itself remains no less true. When the invaders from the north-west of the Balkan peninsula swept over the mountains into the fertile plains of Thessaly, they must have come as semi-nomads, each band staying in one district only so long as to sow and reap a harvest, living a life that hardly admitted the existence of the village, much less of the fortified city. Thucydides knew that the universal acceptance of the city was a slow process; for, although an advanced type of the city-state was attested by Epic tradition, and confirmed by the ruins of Mycenae, the City had not entirely dispossessed the Village in his own day.

Aetolians and others still lived in unfortified communities, and even the Lacedemonian state, though politically a unit, was topographically a collection of villages, 'after the old fashion of Greece.' Athens, the most shining example of the city-state, had risen from the amalgamation of independent towns, and these, in their turn, had grown from village communities. For proof, Thucydides had not merely the evidence of myths attributing the synoecism of Attica to Theseus. His own observation showed him the tenacity of the village as a self-centred unit, surviving the loss of political independence. In times of peace, the farmers might proudly call themselves Athenians and go to market in the town; but the Peloponnesian war, driving the countrymen within the walls of Athens, proved that the village, and not the capital, was their true πόλις. The best commentary on the *Acharnians* or the *Peace* of Aristophanes is a single vivid sentence of Thucydides, describing the desperate plight of the villagers, compelled to leave their houses and their local cults—καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος.⁸

In this rather wistful sympathy with the old village-life of Attica we seem to hear a faint echo of Euripides in his ideal of the farmer. But Thucydides himself, the son of Periclean Athens, would have been the last to depreciate political life—his Village, it will be observed, is a City in embryo. It was Athens, not Attica, that he calls the pattern of Greece. His preceptor is not Hippias, who thought

'law a tyrant,' and showed his self-sufficiency by making his own coat and shoes, but Protagoras, the champion of political law and order.⁹

Even the cosmopolitan Antisthenes, who said that a man would get 'burnt' by too close contact with politics, added that one who kept too far away would be 'frozen.'¹⁰ As we see from Plato, the main problem of the radicals was not how to abolish the city but how to reform it. Common sense must have agreed with the philosopher that 'from cities and governments and acts and laws much virtue has arisen, as well as much vice.'¹¹

The City, then, was natural; and moreover (to Aristotle at least) it represented the perfection of Nature's design, the supreme end to which the Family and the Village are only stages by the way. Other forms of life are 'natural,' being based on the variation of environment—Aristotle mentions five, i.e. that of the shepherd, the farmer, the pirate, the fisherman, and the hunter—but these, whether separate or combined, are not final. Not that Aristotle insists on any temporal succession: just as his species are contemporary, so his 'lives' are not viewed in the light of evolution; and indeed, with the exception of strict pastoral nomadism, of the Scythian type, these modes of living could be found side by side, in his own age and country, where forest and *maquis*, grassland and barren coast, with regions of wheat, vine, and olive, could be traversed in almost a single day's journey. Aristotle knew, of course, that the shepherd preceded the farmer, and he recognised

the Cyclopean pastoral stage as primitive; but it was not his business to trace the 'Life of Greece' through successive epochs—the task of his pupil Dicaearchus—or to discuss their evolutionary importance. He was quite clear about the broad fact of evolution—the State is a compound (*σύνθετον*) which comes into being by a process of growth; but his chief interest was to show that the City exists because it provides the *most* natural form of existence, the fullest capacity for a perfect and self-sufficing life.

Independence was the keynote of the age; and, as an individual could not be *αὐτάρκης* in himself, Aristotle sought for *αὐτάρκεια* in the State. It was precisely for this reason that, in constructing an ideal city, he disapproved of many features in Athens or Corinth. These cities, so far from having attained self-sufficiency, had become the great markets of the world; and Aristotle harks back to the ideal of Sparta in the days when she was most free from the taint of commercial exchange. In progressive Greece, Sparta had long been a survival; her most striking characteristics belonged to a pastoral or an agricultural epoch; but she was more self-centred than Athens, and that was her great merit for Aristotle.¹²

It is precisely because of his insistence on the final cause that Aristotle lays so little stress on the practical needs which led to the evolution of the City. Plato had drawn a brilliant sketch of its genesis from the mutual help of many men—farmer, builder, weaver,

shoemaker, and the like—collected in one place; and although the ideal Platonic city far transcends this material scope, Aristotle refuses to follow his master in discussing such ‘causes.’ The State is concerned with necessities, but they are not the end of political life; otherwise a Nation, which is self-sufficient in necessities, would not be inferior to a City.

Protagoras had distinguished two causes: cities were originally founded as a protection against wild beasts, and were kept together by the later acquisition of a knowledge of justice, and Plato followed Protagoras in suggesting the motive of danger from animals. Aristotle might well neglect this ‘cause’; for (as the Epicureans realised) the struggle between man and beast belongs to a stage far earlier than the evolution of an ordered city.¹³ But there was a more obvious motive in the need of protection against human enemies. In Aristotle’s own lifetime, the foundation of Megalopolis (370 B.C.) was confessedly dictated by military needs, and it would be instructive to know how the philosopher reconciled this fact with his theories of political science; for, while allowing the value of fortifications—indeed he condemns Plato for despising the security of walls—he denies that defence is the real ‘cause’ of a city.¹⁴ For the same reason he does not even mention the view—held afterwards by the Epicureans, and very probable in itself—that the πόλις was often developed from the stronghold of the early king.¹⁵

Besides the desire of self-protection, modern

writers have often pointed to the influence of religion in creating the city-state. Where a city, such as Athens, took the name of its patron deity, we have certainly to reckon with this factor, which need not exclude the other motive, since deity and people have a common interest—the god protects his worshippers, who in their turn protect his temple.¹⁶ Thucydides, with his wonderful insight, had given full credit to the stimulus of religion in early social organisation: for evidence on the topography of ancient Athens he relied, not on mythology or popular tradition, but on the sites of temples; and he held the balance fairly in estimating the positive and negative power of religion in the Attic synoecism. On the one hand, the local cults in separate villages were a hindrance to centralisation; on the other, the historian notes that the common festival of Athena (*ἑυνολία*) tended to unify and consolidate.¹⁷

Aristotle, however, was quite unconscious of religion as a force in the political as well as in the spiritual world. An established cult was of course a necessity in his ideal state; but he was not sure about its exact value in relation to the other necessities, the list of which he enumerates with curious indecision. The case of religion comes 'fifthly, or rather first,' but this concession is modified by the next item in the list—the capacity of deciding things expedient and just, which is 'most necessary of all'! The priesthood is, in fact, a kind of Old Age Pension, a sinecure given to elderly men past active work.¹⁸

But if Aristotle affected to despise the 'necessaries'

of civic life, as being only means to the end, no man was more convinced that the life itself—with its material as well as moral capacities—was the highest possible step in the ladder of human progress. If he was in a sense reactionary, he was quite unconscious of the fact; and neither he nor his school had any sympathy with the Return to Nature. His followers set themselves the task of investigating the history of culture (εὑρήματα); and Theophrastus, while rationalising Prometheus as a human philosopher, paid him honour as the first inventor, appointed by Providence to lift mankind from utter helplessness.¹⁹ Posidonius, with a Stoicism tempered by Peripatetic doctrines, was prominent in upholding the advantages of civilisation, as the gift of philosophy. Seneca, standing for orthodox Stoicism, expends all his rhetoric in attacking a theory which seemed to degrade the philosopher, who never troubled himself about mere utility—no wise man, as Posidonius thought, would have been the first to put copper and iron to practical use: *ista tales inveniunt quales colunt*.²⁰ Seneca's diatribe is characteristic of the man, and, to some extent, of his school; but Stoicism was not always so uncompromising. It is true that the Stoics officially distinguished between necessary and unnecessary arts: while they found a place for agriculture in the Golden Age,²¹ they condemned the first sword and the first ship as signs of degeneracy—a commonplace with poets who had otherwise no leanings towards Stoicism. But Manilius—surely a Stoic—is more liberal; indeed, in the history of civilisation, he differs

from Lucretius only by substituting Divine inspiration for purely human experience, and social instinct for Epicurean selfishness.²² In fact, by the first century B.C., there was a general tendency to agree with the Epicureans, who, if they (no less than the Stoics) discountenanced unnecessary arts, had no quarrel with inventions untainted by luxury. The Romans, proud of their own magnificent city, found a spokesman in Cicero. Addressing a jury, the orator (not, perhaps, without professional bias) assumes that man's progress is due to some philosopher, whose persuasive eloquence taught men the social arts.²³ Bacon and Macaulay may have been right in emphasising the 'unfruitful wisdom' of ancient philosophy, but the Romans thought otherwise. And, as Athens could claim to be the fountain of philosophy, so her intellectual as well as her artistic splendour seemed to warrant the boast that Athens was the mother of arts and civilisation, and the credit, which should have belonged to the race, was monopolised by a single city. An Athenian of the fifth century would hardly have been so exclusive. No doubt the panegyric of a Pericles gave Athens the first place, as the teacher of all Hellas. But, just as Aeschylus was prouder of his service at Marathon than of his tragedies, Pericles conceived that the real mission of his people was Empire. He was at pains to refute the narrow Spartan belief that a warrior-state has no room for art or philosophy; but the main theme of his Funeral Speech is to prove that Athens is not less warlike because she is cultured.

It was not until the waning of political power that Isocrates and the other panegyrists of Athens began to emphasise her special services to mankind; and (as we see from an Amphictyonic decree of the second century B.C.) the rest of Greece acquiesced in her claim to be the benefactress of the human race, which owed to her the foundation of law, the revelation of mysteries, the gift of corn, and the art of the theatre; and the note of gratitude is prolonged by a succession of writers from Lucretius and Cicero to Aelian and late rhetoricians. A Christian writer, like Clement of Alexandria, might extol barbarian inventions at the expense of Athens; but to the end of paganism the Ascent of Man was the Ascent of Athens.²⁴

NOTES

(RP = *Historia Philosophiae Graecae*, by H. Ritter and L. Preller, 8th ed. 1898.)

INTRODUCTION

(1) Masson (*Lucretius*, ii. App. vi. p. 120) thinks that in anthropology Lucretius may have been more independent.

(2) See E. Norden in Fleckeisen's *Jahrb. f. Class. Phil. (Suppl.)* 19, 1893, p. 415 f.

CHAPTER I

(1) See, e.g., Livingstone, *Greek Genius*, p. 54 f.

(2) Hes. *Theog.* 27, 97 f.

(3) Aesch. *Prom. Sol.* fr. 8.

(4) Cave-dwellers (*καρουνδαῖοι, τραγλοδύται*) first in Hesiod (fr. 60 Rzach) and Scylax.

(5) Aesch. *P.V.* 792 f., *Prom. Sol.* fr. 7.

(6) Herod. iv. 46; cf. 64 f., and vi. 84. Thucydides (ii. 97) still more definitely explodes the idea of Scythian excellence, but in a modified form it reappears in Nicolaus Damasc. (*F.H.G.* iii. 123) and Strabo (296, 299 f., 513). Cf. Lucian, *Toxaris*. It was long before the Scythians became proverbial for lawlessness; cf. Origen, *c. Cels.* i. 1. See generally R. Pöhlmann, *Gesch. d. ant. Communismus*, i. p. 104 f.

(7) Herod. iii. 116. Aristotle, holding that the climate of Greece preserves the happy mean, had no sympathy with this view and in consequence no belief in Scythian excellence.

(8) Herod. v. 86.

(9) Thuc. i. 5-7. J. F. M'Lennan, *Studies in Ancient History* (2nd series), p. 24 f.

(10) For Aristotle cf. *Pol.* i. 2. 1252 b 19, i. 9. 1257 a 24, &c. On his νόμῳ βαρβαρικά see Cic. *Fin.* iii. 5, 11. Theophrastus studied barbarian 'laws' (περὶ νόμων). *Rhet.* i. 4. 1360 a.

(11) Lucr. v. 17, Vitruv. ii. 1, 4 f.

(12) Herod. iv. 104.

(13) J. L. Myres in *Anthropology and the Classics*, p. 153 f., W. Ridgway in *Cambridge Praelections* (1906), p. 148 f.; but see H. J. Rose in *Folklore* xxii. 3, p. 277 f., and L. R. Farnell, *Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, p. 25.

(14) Varro, *ap.* August. *C.D.* xviii. 9. On the small value of this evidence for mother-right, see Rose *l.c.*

(15) In a new fragment of Pherecydes, Zeus himself announces the ἑπὸς γάμος as a pattern; see Weil in *Revue des Ét. Gr.* 1897, p. 3.

(16) *Eth. Nic.* viii. 12. 1160 b 31. In *Pol.* i. 2. 1252 b 23 the quotation is correct.

(17) For Euripides cf. fr. 655 Dind., and 406; for the Cynics Diog. L. vi. 72. See generally Dümmler, *Prolog zu Platons Staat*, p. 55.

(18) See E. Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, p. 50 f., A. Lang in *Encycl. Brit.* art. 'Family.'

(19) Herod. iii. 108.

(20) On this tract see Diels, *Vorsokr.*² ii. 1. p. 635; A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socr.* (1st series), p. 91.

(21) For Pyrrho, see Diog. L. ix. 83; for Antisthenes and the Cynics, Dümmler, *Academica*, p. 259 f.; for Chrysippus, Cic. *Tusc.* i. 45, 108; for Julian, *fr. ep.* 292 (p. 375 Hertlein). The *couvade* in Apoll. Rhod. B. 1013. For other exx. of savage life cf. *ib.* 1017, Γ. 200. For collections of strange customs cf. also Aelian *V. H.* iv. 1.

(22) Cic. *N.D.* i. 23, Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4, 19 f. On the consensus see generally Cic. *N.D.* i. 16, ii. 4, *Tusc.* i. 13.

(23) *Anthropology and the Classics*, p. 145 f.

(24) Cf. Xen. *Symp.* ii. 9, Plat. *Meno* 71 A f, Arist. *Pol.* i. 13. 1260 a 22. Antisthenes (and some Stoics) followed Socrates (Diog. L. vi. 12); but Aristotle and the Epicureans rejected the claim of feminine equality; cf. Lucr. v. 1355.

(25) Soph. *O.C.* 337.

(26) J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*,³ Pt. v. i. ch. 4.

(27) Strabo, 165, Tac. *Germ.* 15. For women in religion see the new fr. of the *Melanippe* in *Trag. Gr. fr. pap.* Oxford, 1912.

(28) Xen. *Mem.* iv. 1, 3, *Oec.* vii. 32; Cic. *Fin.* ii. 10, 32.

(29) *Rep.* 452 C.

(30) *Crat.* 425 E, 397 C, *Laws* 680 B.

- (31) *Rep.* 375 E, 424 A, 451 D, 466 D.
- (32) *Pol.* ii. 5. 1264 b 4, [Arist.] *H.A.* ix. 1. 608 a 9.
- (33) *Laws* 804 E, *Critias* 110 B, *Laws* 637 D.
- (34) S. Butler, *Note Books* (1912) p. 29. For the comparative method of Diogenes see Diog. L. vi. 12, Dümmler, *Antisthenica*, p. 68.
- (35) Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 22, Diog. L. vi. 188; Origen, c. *Cels.* iv. 45. See Arnim, *Stoic. vet. fr.* iii. 743.
- (36) Strabo, 778; cf. 745 and Plut. *Q.R.* 83. For Fontenelle see A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, App. A.
- (37) Galen, *de usu part.* iii. 1, 169 f.

CHAPTER II

- (1) See L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, i. p. 48 f.
- (2) *Od.* xx. 202, Hes. *Op.* 109 f.
- (3) *Il.* xiv. 246, Hes. *Op.* 108, Pind. *Nem.* vi. 1. Cf. *Hom. h.* xxx.
- (4) *Tim.* 40 B.
- (5) *Theog.* 116 f.
- (6) Aesch. fr. 41, Eur. fr. 488, 836, 890 (Dind.), Lucr. ii. 991.
- (7) *Orph. h.* xxxvii. 1, see J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, p. 490, and *Themis*, p. 463.
- (8) Hes. fr. 70 (43 Rzach), Paus. viii. 1, 2.
- (9) Antisthenes in Diog. L. vi. 1, Lucian, *Philops.* 3.
- (10) See Diog. L., *Prol.* 3.
- (11) Kinkel, *F.E.G.* p. 209, Plat. *Tim.* 22 A, Paus. ii. 19, 5.
- (12) Bergk, *P.L.G. fr. inc.* 84. Cf. Herod. ii. 2.
- (13) Hes. *Op.* 145; the idea is elaborated in Statius, *Theb.* iv. 275; cf. Virg. *Aen.* viii. 315, Juv. vi. 12. For parallels from other races see Mannhardt, *Baumk.* p. 7 f., and for the ash-tree, Murr, *Pflanzenwelt*, p. 29, Gruppe, *Griech. Myth.* p. 432 n. For other Greek views on human origins see A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Placita Gr. de orig. generis humani* (1871).
- (14) For Deucalion cf. Hes. fr. 115 (Rzach), Pind. *Ol.* ix. 45; for the ant-men, Hes. fr. 76, Apollod. iii. 158.
- (15) Plat. *Prot.* 320 D; cf. Aristoph. *Av.* 686. See Frazer on Paus. x. 4, 4, and in *Darwin and Modern Science*, p. 152; Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, p. 184.
- (16) *Polit.* 272 A, *Tim.* 76 E; cf. Paus. i. 24, 7.
- (17) J. C. Lawson, *Mod. Greek Folklore*, p. 134.
- (18) Herod. ii. 143. The date of the Flood computed by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. 145.

- (19) Plat. *Lys.* 205 C, *Tim.* 40 D, *Theaet.* 175 A. For Plato's divine parentage cf. Diog. L. iii. 1.
- (20) See W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, pp. 10, 108.
- (21) Plut. *Is.* 24.
- (22) Herod. i. 68.
- (23) Lucr. v. 1285, Varro *ap.* August. *C.D.* vii. 24; Seneca, *Q.N.* i. 17, 6.
- (24) See Ridgway, *Early Age*, p. 628, quoting Diod. v. 32, 2 (Gallic children are *πολιά* at birth); but cf. Plat. *Polit.* 270 E, and other passages quoted by J. Adam, *Religious Teachers*, p. 78.
- (25) For the cycle in religion see J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, p. xiii; in history, Bury, *Anc. Greek Historians*, p. 247 f, and generally Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (E.T.) i. p. 140 f. For the Christian objection, August. *C.D.* xii. 14.
- (26) Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 265. For Greece, see Dieterich, *Mutter-Erde*, p. 6, J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*³ (*Magic Art*) i. p. 96 f.
- (27) Arist. *Phys.* iv. 4. 223 b 24: *φασὶ γὰρ κύκλον εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα*. For Hebrew thought cf. *Job* iii. 3, *Psalms* xix. 2.
- (28) Paus. ii. 15, 5, viii. 1, 2 f.
- (29) Xenoph. fr. 18 (RP 104 b), Plat. *Prot.* 320 C f., *Soph. Ant.* 332, Eur. *Supp.* 201, Nauck, p. 771 (*Critias*) and p. 813 (*Moschion*).
- (30) *Phileb.* 16 C.
- (31) *Laws* 656 E, 677 A (cf. *Theaet.* 175 A); *Tim.* 21 E (cf. *Critias* 109 D, Diod. i. 10). See also Strabo 592.
- (32) Plato (*Laws* 781 E) mentions the belief. Aristotle acknowledges the *possibility* of an origin from the earth (*Pol.* ii. 8. 1269 a 4), but does not seem to accept the theory. For the 'egg and bird,' cf. Plut. *Q. Symp.* ii. 3, 3, Censor. *de die nat.* 4.
- (33) Arist. *Pol.* ii. 5. 1264 a 2, vii. 10. 1329 b 25, Theophr. fr. 30, *Polyb.* vi. 5.
- (34) *Progrès de l'Esprit Humain* (1795), ch. i.
- (35) For a modern rendering of the cyclic theory see W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Revolutions of Civilisation*. On the other side, L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Progress*, ch. iii.

CHAPTER III

- (1) See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*,² p. 12 f.
- (2) The testimony for Anaximander is given by RP 22. Add Censor. *de die nat.* 4. In Plut. *Q. Symp.* viii. 8, 4, the correction

γαλεοί for παλαιοί is fairly certain. On Aristotle's description of the γαλεός λείος see *H.A.* vi. 10. 565 b 1, *G.A.* iii. 3. 754 b. See D'Arcy Thomson *On Aristotle as a Biologist* (Oxford, 1913), p. 20. Cf. also *Plut. soll. an.* 33.

(3) I have criticised Prof. Myres' view of 'an almost Darwinian outlook' in *Folklore* xx. 4 (1909), p. 421 f.

(4) *RP* 172, 177 b.

(5) See G. S. Brett, *History of Psychology*, p. 39.

(6) Cf. *Arist. Phys.* ii. 8. 198 b 30.

(7) In *Plat. Symp.* 189 E. Aristophanes adapts the idea of τύποι οὐλοφυνεῖς to his burlesque theory of original man as androgynous. On the origin of vertebrates cf. *Arist. P.A.* i. 1. 640 a 19 (tr. Ogle).

(8) *G.A.* i. 18. 722 b. Cf. *Censor.* 4.

(9) *Lucr.* v. 837. The theory of random parts survived in poetry, to account for monsters; cf. *Apoll. Rhod.* iv. 676.

(10) Osborn (*From the Greeks to Darwin*, p. 40) follows Zeller.

(11) Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 388; J. G. Frazer, in *Darwin and Modern Science*, p. 168. See generally A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, ii. p. 170 f.

(12) The difference is noted by Ogle (*P.A.* ed. 1886, p. ii); but it may now be remarked that recent biologists tend to substitute the formula 'survival of the fit' for Darwin's 'fittest.' According to Sir E. Ray Lankester (*Kingdom of Man*, ch. i) Darwin's 'survival of the fittest' does not concern the struggle between species (the Lucretian sense), but between individuals in the same species. But Darwin certainly included the struggle between different species, if they compete in food-supply (see *Origin of Species*, ch. 3). The Peripatetics remarked on the enmity of animals in these conditions (*Arist. H.A.* ix. 1. 608 b 20).

(13) *Darwin and Modern Science*, p. 21.

(14) *G.A.* iii. 2. 762 b.

(15) *Censor.* 4, *Lucr.* v. 805 f.

(16) Burnet,² p. 315 (*RP* 128); *Arist. P.A.* iv. 10. 687 a 9, *Plut. de frat. am.* 2.

(17) *Xen. Mem.* iv. 3, 9; cf. *Herod.* iii. 108 f.

(18) *Theophr. de sensu*, 48.

(19) *Lucr.* v. 966, *Vitruv.* ii. 1, 2, *Diod.* i. 8. For Aristotle, cf. *H.A.* ii. 8. 502 a 16. So *Galen, de usu part.* i. 22, 79 f.

(20) For Archelaus, see *RP* 217.

(21) Actually he was born at Samos (341 B.C.), but his parents were Athenian. For his debt to older thinkers cf. *Diog. L.* x. 12.

(22) *Phys.* ii. 8. 198 b 10. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (E.T.) iv.

p. 134 follows the usual interpretation, but admits that the mechanical argument is surprising in Aristotle.

(23) Plut. *soll. an.* 20; cf. Vitruv. ii. 1, 2, Lucr. v. 1379, Philod. *de mus.* 36 (Kemke, p. 108).

(24) Ratzel, *History of Mankind* (E.T.) i. p. 77.

(25) *H.A.* ix. 608 a 15, 612 b 18.

(26) *Descent of Man*, ch. 3.

(27) For authorities see Sir J. E. Sandys, *Hist. Class. Schol.* i. p. 91 f. Add F. Muller *de veterum impr. Rom. stud. etym.* i. (1910) and Giussani's ed. of Lucretius (vol. i. p. 267 f.), both of which books I have found valuable for the Epicurean view of language.

(28) *Crat.* 437 E; cf. 389 D, 421 D; A. Gellius, x. 4. For the heresy at Mount Athos see *The Times*, June 19 and July 24, 1913.

(29) Lucr. v. 1027 f., Diog. Oen. fr. 10 (Williams, p. 17).

(30) Epicurus, *ep. ad Herod.* (Diog. L. x. 75 f.). Giussani remarks that later Epicureans obscured the second stage (of *θείσις*), confounding it with that of *φύσις*.

CHAPTER IV

(1) *Pol.* i. 3. 1253 b 20, 1255 a 3, Eur. *Melanippe* (fr. 514, 515 Dindorf).

(2) *H.A.* ii. 1. 500 b 33.

(3) Plut. *de Alex. fort.* 6, Strabo 66.

(4) Lucian, *quom. scr. sit hist.* 54, Plut. *de mal. Herod.* 12 and 53; cf. Herod. vii. 238.

(5) Diog. L. vi. 2.

(6) Herod. i. 196, 199. See Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, p. 268, E. S. Hartland in *Anthrop. Essays* to E. B. Tylor, p. 188 f.

(7) Livingstone, *Greek Genius*, p. 153.

(8) Herod. i. 140, Paus. viii. 38, 7.

(9) iii. 144.

(10) i. 57, 171; vii. 70; ii. 2, 105.

(11) i. 171; cf. Strabo 659.

(12) ii. 167; vi. 53 f.; v. 87, i. 135.

(13) ii. 61, 104.

(14) See F. Ratzel, *History of Mankind* (E.T. 1896) i.; W. H. R. Rivers, *Pres. Address Brit. Assoc.* 1911.

(15) Hippocr. *de aere, aquis, locis* 24, Aesch. *P.V.* 22, 808, *Supp.* 155, 279, 284. See generally Herod. iii. 106, Plat. *Rep.* 435 E, *Tim.* 24 C, *Epin.* 987 D, Arist. *Pol.* vii. 7. 1327 b 23, Posidonius in Förster, *Script. phys.* ii. p. 66.

(16) *Eccl.* 385, schol. on *Peace* 1310.

(17) Theodectes, fr. 17 (Nauck) *ap.* Strab. 695, where Strabo's own view is given. For Aristotle, cf. *G.A.* v. 3. 782 b, *H.A.* iii. 10. 517 b 17, [Arist.] *Probl.* xiv. 4.

(18) Eur. *Med.* 825, Plat. *Critias*, 109 B f.

(19) On this feature see J. L. Myres, *Inaug. Lect.* (Oxford 1910), p. 24, who shows that the encroachment of scrubland is a continuous process, partly justifying Plato's geological theory.

(20) Thuc. i. 2; cf. Plut. *Solon* 22. Xenophon, however, was enthusiastic over the natural advantages and fertility of Attica (*Vect.* i. 3). On the Cranai see schol. on Aristoph. *Av.* 123, Galen, *Protrept.* 7.

(21) Polyb. iv. 21 (Shuckburgh). For Strabo cf. 286 (122, 376, &c.) in favour of environment; his criticism is in 102 f., 136; cf. 501, 833. The Romans (e.g. Livy xxxviii. 17, Manil. iv. 711 f.) upheld the geographical theory, but laid more stress than the Greeks on heredity. For the modern 'anthropo-geographical' theory see E. C. Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment*.

(22) Hippocr. *de aere* 24; 16, 23. Plat. *Laws* 747 C f.

(23) *Rep.* 424 A, *Laws* 766 A. Plato here agreed with Democritus (ἡ διδασχὴ φυσιοποιεῖ fr. 133 Mullach, p. 186).

(24) Herod. v. 9. Myres in *Anthrop. and the Classics*, p. 142, and in *Anthrop. Essays* to E. B. Tylor, p. 255 f.

(25) Herod. i. 56 f., Aesch. *Supp.* 234, 914. See generally Macan on Herod. viii. 44, Myres, *l.c.* p. 152 and in *Journ. Hell. St.* xxvii. p. 170 f., E. Meyer, *Forsch.* i. p. 112 f.

(26) Thuc. i. 3, Isocr. *Paneg.* 50.

(27) *Polit.* 262 D, *Rep.* 470 C.

(28) Eur. *Med.* 536, Theophilus in Bekker *An. Gr.* p. 724. For the monopoly of Greek philosophers see Epic. *ap.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. 15, Diog. L. x. 117.

(29) Theophr. *Char.* vii. (xxi.) with Jebb's note.

(30) See Lord Cromer, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, p. 131 f.; Sir C. P. Lucas, *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*, p. 97.

(31) Arist. *H.A.* viii. 11. 597 a 6; Strabo, 821.

CHAPTER V

(1) *P.V.* 88, trans. Morshead.

(2) Lucr. v. 195 f., Plin. *N.H.* vii. 1 f. On the other side, Strabo 188 f., 809 f.

(3) Lucian, *Amor.* 436 f.

(4) Theocr. vii. 2.

(5) Eur. *Or.* 917. Cf. Menander, *Georg.* 16 and 109 (Nicole).

- (6) For the ideal of city-life see modern reff. in Billeter, *Anschaungen d. Griech.* p. 429.
- (7) Thuc. i. 2. See A. E. Zimmern, *Greek Commonwealth*, p. 72.
- (8) i. 10, iii. 94, ii. 16.
- (9) On these sophists see Chiapelli in *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosoph.* iii. 1, p. 260, Dümmler, *Kleine Schrift.* i. p. 205.
- (10) Stob. *Flor.* 45, 28 (RP 284 c).
- (11) *Laws* 678 A.
- (12) See E. Barker, *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 389.
- (13) Plat. *Prot.* 322 B, *Laws* 681 A, *Polit.* 274 B. Lucr. v. 963 f.
- (14) Plat. *Laws* 778 D, Arist. *Pol.* vii. 11. 1330 b 32. In the *Republic* Plato barely suggests the need of defence as the cause of his First City.
- (15) Lucr. v. 1108.
- (16) Warde Fowler, *City State*, p. 44; Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, p. 21.
- (17) Thuc. ii. 15, 16.
- (18) *Pol.* vii. 8. 1328 b 12.
- (19) Theophr. fr. 50 = schol. Apoll. Rhod. B. 1248.
- (20) *Ep.* 90.
- (21) First in Aratus, *Phaen.* 97 f.
- (22) Manil. *Astron.* i. 66 f.
- (23) Cic. *Sest.* 42, *Invent.* i. 2, *de orat.* i. 8, 9, *Tusc.* i. 26, v. 9.
- (24) For the decree see *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 1900, p. 96, Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, p. 308 f. Cf. Lucr. vi. 1, Cic. *Flacc.* 26, Diod. v. 4, 4, xii. 26, 3; Aelian, *V.H.* iii. 38; Athen. xv. 13 and often. On the other side, e.g., Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. 15 f.

INDEX

- ACHAEANS, 30
 Aeschylus, 5 f., 10, 13, 39, 79, 86, 91
 Agathyrsi, 12
 Ages, ix., 9, 33 f.
 Agriculture, 18, 93, 100
 Air, 57, 59, 80
 Anaxagoras, 21, 27, 40, 55 f.
 Anaximander, 48 f.
 Animals, kinship with, 19
 imitation of, 22, 92
 in Aristotle, 72
 and plants, 55, 59, 71
 Antisthenes, 74, 96
 Apollonius, 16
 Archelaus, 58
 Arimaspi, 6 f.
 Aristeeas, 5
 Aristophanes, 14, 19
 Aristotle, 9, 11, 13, 20, 42, 49, 57, 61; 71 f., 89
 Arts, origin of, ix., 37, 42, 100

 BIRTH, of man, 25 f.

 CANNIBALISM, 21
 Chrysippus, 16
 Cicero, 101
 Climate, 79
 Colour, 79
 bar, 88
Consensus gentium, 17
 Critias, 40

 Culture, test of, 77
 Custom, savage, 14 f., 74
 Cyclic theory, 35 f., 50
 Cyclopes, 3, 5, 7, 13, 42, 97
 Cynics, 10, 14, 21, 74, 92

 DEMOSTHENES, 33, 70
 Dicaearchus, 97
 Diogenes (of Apollonia), 57
 Diogenes (Cynicus), 21
 Diogenes (of Oenoanda), 66

 EGYPT, 15, 41, 74, 80
 Empedocles, 33, 49 f., 59
 Epicurus (and Epicureans), vii. f., 12, 19, 43, 54, 57, 59, 66 f., 91, 98, 101
 Eratosthenes, 2, 73
 Euripides, 14, 19, 39, 70, 88, 93

 FAMILY, 12 f.

 GALEN, 24
 Geographical influence, 79 f.

 HAND, human, 56
 Hecataeus, 4, 31
 Hellenism, 87
 Heraclitus, 15, 64

- Herodotus, 6 f., 10, 12, 15 f., 20,
 31, 73 f., 84 f.
 Hesiod, 1 f., 26 f., 31, 33 f.
 Hippias, 17, 95
 Hippocrates, 79 f., 83
 Homer, 1 f., 5, 25, 31
 Hyperboreans, 7

 ISOCRATES, 70

 JULIAN, 16

 KALLATIAE, 15

 LANGUAGE, origin of, 62 f.
 test of, 76

 MAN-GOD, 33
 Manilius, 100
 Marriage, 13
 Mimicry, 60 f.
 Monkey, 56, 58
 Moschion, 40
 Mother-right, 12 f.

 NATURE, 14, 91 f.
 Nicolaus, 16

 ORPHICS, 24 f.

 PAUSANIAS, 27, 75
 Pelasgus, 27
 Pelasgians, 30, 76, 86
 Phoroneus, 28, 37

 Plato, 2, 17 f., 26, 30, 32 f., 41,
 64, 80, 83, 87, 96 f.
 Plutarch, 22, 49
 Polybius, 81
 Posidonius, 100
 Progress, xi., 37, 43
 Prometheus, ix., 29, 39 f., 100
 Protagoras, 39, 96, 98
 Pygmies, 5, 89
 Pyrrho, 16
 Pythagoras, 22, 36

 RACE, 45, 75 f.
 Re-birth, 36

 SCYTHIANS, 5, 7, 10, 96
 Seneca, 100
 Sigynnae, 85
 Slaves, 71, 88
 Socrates, 17 f., 56 f.
 Sophocles, 39
 Stoics, 32, 57, 91, 100
 Strabo, 18, 23, 82, 89

 THEOPHRASTUS, 42, 57, 82, 100
 Thucydides, 2, 10, 69, 81, 85 f.,
 94 f., 99

 VILLAGE, 94, 99
 Vitruvius, 12

 WATER, 80
 Women in sociology, 12, 18 f.

 XENOPHANES, 2, 10, 38
 Xenophon, 19, 73, 93

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